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UDĀNAVARGA

Chapter II

KĀMAVARGA - Desire

1. O desire, I know your root; it is from imagination that you spring.
I will not imagine you, and you will not arise in me.
2. From deesires springs grief, from desiree eprings fear; men free from
desires have no grief; whence could fear (come to them)?
3. From pleasures springs grief, from pleasures springs fear; men freed
from pleasures have no grief; whence could fear (come to them)?
4. At first sweet, but bitter in their maturity... desiree burn the madman,
as a torch burns the hand, if it is not relinquished.
5. It is not the bond of iron, of wood, of balba grass, that the venerable
ones have declared solid. (The solid bond) is the attention which att-
aches the mind to earrings of precious etones, to children, to women.
6. This is the bond that the venerable ones have declared solid, every-
where rigid, difficult to unbind. But men without desires, even break-
ing that bond, devote themselves to the wandering life, renouncing the
joys of desire.
7. The brilliant things of this world are not desires, man's desire is
coloured by imagination. Brilliant things exist in this world, and here
below, the wise tame their desires.
8. Desires are not eternal among men. And transitory are the things to
which men subject to desire are attached. He who renounces this in order
to avoid being reborn, I say that he will not go the kingdom of death.
9. Of the man in whom the aspiration (for Nirvāna) is born, who has escaped
impurity (?), whose mind is calm, whose thought is not attached to
desire, it is said: He is above the stream (urdhvasrotah).
10. Gradually, little by little, tirelessly, the wise man should cast out
the defilement in himself, like the workman that in silver.
11. Like the cartwright (?) cutting out shoes from leather... as one cuts
out desires, things take a more favourable turn.
12. He who seeks complete happiness, let him renounce all deesiree;
having renounced all desires, he attains supreme happiness.

13. As long as desire is pursued, mental contentment is not found; then, those find contentment, who find it in wisdom.
14. It is better to have contentment in wisdom; for desire does not content; the man who finds contentment in wisdom does not fall under the blow of a (second) existence.
15. Men distracted by desires, in truth delight in the wrong; they do not perceive the danger, even if their life is near its end.
16. Possessions cause the downfall of the fool, but not of him who seeks by himself. The fool through his possessions and his cravings causes his own downfall as well as that of others.
17. Even a shower of karsāpanas does not bring the satisfaction of desires; there is only a faint taste of happiness in desires, the wise man knows this.
18. Even in the heavenly enjoyments, delight is not found. The Buddha's disciple finds his pleasure in the suppression of craving.
19. Even a golden mountain such as the Himālaya would not be treasure enough for a single man; knowing this, one goes in peace.
20. The man who knows what suffering is and what its origin is, how could he find delight in desire? Attachment, in this world, is wretchedness; with this thought, the wise man would learn to cast it out.

(Translated by Sara Boin Webb from the French of N.P.Chakravarti)

NOTES ON PĀLI CANONIC STYLE

A.Syrkin

Notwithstanding certain re-evaluations of the views of the older Anglo-German school on the authentic value of the Pali Canon, this preserves its importance as the most complete and consecutive exposition of earlier Buddhist dogmatics¹, the exposition presenting a source, irreplaceable both from a historical and literary point of view. Within the frames of the Canon, the Dīgha Nikāya (DN) - "the book of longer sayings" - opens the second of the three Pīṭakas - dedicated first of all to ethics and containing the best artistic specimens of Pāli. The genre of sutta is represented in DN by the longest (cf. the title of the book) and the relatively complex texts, as regards plot and composition. At the same time DN is evidently one of the oldest parts of the Pali Canon, compiled during the first two-three centuries after the Buddha's death.² The analysis of DN style seems, therefore, to be significant for the study of earlier Pāli artistic style and, wider, of classical Indian poetics, including non-Buddhist tradition. The language of DN excels by a rich vocabulary (surpassing in this respect some of the Hindu canonical texts - e.g. the Upaniṣads) and together with some other Tipitaka books, can be regarded as a model of classical Pāli.³

DN is divided into three parts (vaṅga) containing, respectively, 13, 10 and 11 suttas unified according to rather different principles.⁴ The first part, Sīlakkhandavagga ("A section referring to ethical rules"), includes I - XIII suttas⁵ with common content each of which presents certain rules of moral conduct (sīla), speaks about knowing the truth and degrees of perfection (jhāna), leading to the highest concentration (samādhi). Corresponding admonitions repeat themselves with certain abbreviations and variants (such as different refrains; addresses that change according to the personality of interlocutor; use of synonyms - e.g. sīla - carana etc.) in II-XIII, beginning with the words idha...Tathāgato loke upajjati - "There appears in the world...an arahant"⁶ (II 40 a.o.) - and ending with nāparam itthattāyāti - "After this present life there will be no beyond..." (II 98 a.o.).⁷ This repetition, divided in different suttas into a different number of paragraphs (see DRC,I) comprises II 40-98 = III 2-2 = IV 23 = V 27 = VI 16-19 = VII 2-5 = VIII 19-20 = IX 7-13 = X 1.7-2.36 = XI 9-66 = XII 19-77 = XIII 40-75. As for other parts of these suttas, some of them include independent narrations with various precepts (III,V,XIII), while some present strictly speaking only more or less original frames of the repetition mentioned (cf. below). Most of them contain in the last lines (though sometimes a little earlier) stereotype words of the Buddha's converted opponent, who sought to be accepted into the

Order. We find here this formula in 8 out of 13 suttas (II-IV, VIII-X, XII, XIII), and only three times in all the other 21 suttas of DN (XVI 5.28; XXIII 29; XXXI 35).

The next section, Mahāvagga ("A large section"), though containing less suttas than the first and the third part of DN (10, i.e. XIV-XXIII), is indeed the largest - thanks to the size of XVI Mahāparinibbāna (other suttas of this part are much shorter and approximately equal to other DN suttas). In seven of them (XIV-XVII, XIX, XX, XXII) the title begins with Mahā-, which is not used in the other parts. This definition, reflected in the title of the second part, was explained particularly by the supposition that corresponding suttas existed previously in larger versions and were abridged in the extant text.⁸ In any case, the principles of unification seems to be quite formal here. At the same time some traits differentiate XIV-XXIII suttas from I-XIII: certain developed techniques of narrative, use of mythological plots, evolution of certain concepts. We find here much more metrical interpolations (*gāthā*) than in the first part (34 to 3). Within the frames of the second part of DN, perhaps only XV and XXIII (incidentally, containing only a few verses) are more similar to the suttas of the first part.

The third part of DN, Pāṭikavagga - XXIV-XXXIV, is deliberately named after the Buddha's unsuccessful adversary from the first sutta of this part (XXIV - Pāṭika Sutta), which occurs only in this portion of DN.⁹ The narrative element is also relatively developed here and the number of *gāthā* is still larger (146). It was supposed that some traits of this part are connected with addressing rather big audiences.¹⁰ The third part is heterogeneous enough in respect of its didactics and the ways of presentation. Purely didactic texts like XXVIII, XXXIII, XXXIV alternate here with those reflecting ritual procedures (XXXII - a peculiar charm against evil forces), views on cosmogony, natural history, social relations (XXVI, XXVII). The didactics themselves are not confined to Buddhist doctrine and the Order but refer also to the life of the householder (cf. XXXI). In XXIV the Buddha's precepts are combined with a vivid portrait of his opponent, Pāṭika, and probably contain certain elements of humour (see below). XXVI and especially XXVII are perhaps influenced by legends of the Purāṇic type. In separate suttas (cf. XXX, XXXI, XXXII) the major part of the text consists of verses. On the other hand, XXXIII and XXXIV (excepting 1.1) are written entirely in prose and stand apart from other suttas of DN, with respect to their composition (see below; cf. also XXXI 8-12; 15-19; 21-25; 28-33). XXV is relatively near to the suttas of the first part (cf. VIII) whereas XXVIII presents an expanded variant of XVI 1.15-17. We shall return again to certain peculiarities, which distinguish separate parts of DN.

The verses (*gāthā*) of DN, based on the syllabic principle, are mostly represented (with certain digressions) by metres containing eight (*aloka*, *anuttubha*), or eleven (*tutthubha*) syllables in each of four (or six) parts (*paḍa*).¹¹ As stated, these verses are almost absent in the first part of DN, where they serve only as a résumé of separate verses (cf. III 1.28; XI 85). They occur more often in the second and even more so in the third part, fulfilling a narrative function and freely alternating with prose (cf. e.g. in XVI). Sometimes they play an independent rôle which is confined neither to didactics nor narration and sounds somewhat emotional (cf. XIX 44; monologue of Pañcasikha in XXI 5 sq. etc.). They can constitute a prominent part of separate suttas - e.g. almost all XX (5-22), or XXXII (3-7, 10). An interesting case is that of XXX in which prose systematically alternates with verses containing metrical variations¹² (cf. also XXXI). Every part of DN is also concluded by a strophe, listing all corresponding suttas. The rôle of verses in DN and more so in some other Tipitaka books permits one to suggest that the Pali Canon is based not only on narrative prosaic texts (in particular of the Brāhmaṇa kind) but on poetic texts as well.¹³

R.O. Franke suggests that the supposed unity and completeness of DN indicates a single man's authorship and literary redaction.¹⁴ Such unity, however, seems to be somewhat exaggerated by him and is refuted by some scholars.¹⁵ As we see, within the framework of different parts the narration is different enough with respect both to style and composition. It has already been observed (P. Bapat, G. Pande a.o.) that a lack of uniformity can be perceived not only in separate parts of DN, but in separate suttas as well. At the same time, one cannot deny certain traits which are common to the whole Book. In particular, some textual and thematic (cf. below) parallels between neighbouring suttas - cf. already mentioned repetitions in II-XIII, description of different professions in I-II, evidences on Bimbisāra in IV-V, connection between events described in XVI and XVII (death of the Buddha) etc.¹⁶ Another trait is that of consequent "fastenings" (*Verknüpfungen*) between I and II, II and III, III and IV etc. with the help of specific formulae.¹⁷ These observations are quite correct, though it remains very probable that such parallelisms were, for the major part, stimulated not so much by the redactor's premeditated unification of the text, as by more general and impersonal traits of Pāli canonic style such as use of stereotype expressions, formulas, repetitions (see below) etc. These traits permit one to establish numerous textual coincidences, not only within the framework of DN but, e.g. between different Nikāyas of the Sutta Pitaka itself.

Among such common principles, important for the structure of the text, one can mention the description based on the enumeration (exhaustive or se-

lective) of logical possibilities or of qualities combined within a definite set - a device which goes beyond the Buddhist or Hindu tradition and leads us to a more general problem of the history of scientific language. For example, we find it already in I where the following possibilities are enumerated: "Whether there is another world?" - "Whether there is not another world?" - "Whether there both is and is not another world?" - "Whether there neither is nor is not another world?" and so on, concerning other phenomena (I 2.27; cf. similar constructions of the type P, not P (or opposite to P), P and not P, neither P nor not P, in VI 6 sq.; VIII 4; IX 27,31 etc.).¹⁸ One can see that a major part of these enumerations is necessarily based on fourfold sets, which can be correlated with an evidently predominant rôle of tetrad and its multiples in Buddhist canonical texts. Such is, e.g., a number of precepts connected with "four grounds" (vatthūni) in I 1.30; 2.1 sq.; 16 sq.; 23 sq. etc. The 62 doctrines (ditthi, i.e. the wrong views described by the Buddha in DN 1)^{18a} classified according to these grounds are distributed thus: 16 (4+4+4+2) + 44 (16 (4+4+4+4) + 8 (4+4) + 8 (4+4) + 7 + 5). We can cite in this connection II 91; IV 4 sq.; VI 6-7; XI 67 sq.; XIII 76-77; XXII 6 etc. The corresponding principle is perhaps the most important in traditional Buddhist dogmatics - cf. such concepts, often mentioned in DN, also as the four noble Truths (ariya sacca), the four degrees of perfection (jhāna), the eightfold path (aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo), the thirty-two signs of the Buddha (lakkhana) etc.

The principle of triad is relatively less important, though we can trace it on different levels as well. Apart from more general regularities (cf. division of the Tipitaka itself), we find it consecutively in the triple structure of DN, in I and in I.1 (1.7-10; 11-20; 21-27).¹⁹ This principle is used in the structure of repetitions (see below) - cf. threefold addresses in XI 1-3; XIV 3.3-6; XVI 5.24 etc.; questions in III 1.20; XI 81-83; XIII 11 etc. Concerning dogmatics, one can be reminded here of numerous references to the Three Refuges (Tisarāṇa: Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha), used for joining the Order.²⁰ Cf. also three kinds of self (atta) - IX 39 sq.; three bodies of doctrine - X 1.6; three kinds of wonders - XI 3 etc.

Other number complexes, though not so important, were often used in Buddhist tradition²¹ - numerous examples are presented in XXXIII and XXXIV built on corresponding principles. The analysis of separate lists, however deliberate they may seem, can also show certain regularities - cf. for example, the rôle of sevenfold sets in II 20 (seven kinds of gods, of men, of demons, of great lakes etc.). Some of these examples have noteworthy parallels in other traditions.²² At the same time separate fragments can be probably regarded as a tribute to a kind of "number automatism" - for example in the exposition of

XXXIII and XXXIV, already mentioned above, where we find a consecutive gradation from 1 to 10 (relatively more regulated in XXXIV, which gives ten examples of every separate number complex - cf. also XXXI). A similar principle serves as a basis for a much larger Pāli canonic text - Aṅguttara Nikāya, compiled evidently later. We find other examples of such automatism in I 1.31 sq. where the Buddha speaks consecutively of one, two, three, four, five, etc. former births.²³

The character and rôle of number symbolism in DN is connected with another characteristic trait of the text - that of repetitions. The latter is also typical of classical Indian texts beyond the Buddhist tradition (cf. e.g. Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad II 4 = IV 5; Brhadār. Up. II 1 = Kausītaki Up. IV etc.)²⁴ and has numerous analogies in other cultures (for example, in the synoptic Gospels). One can see, however, that in Pāli canonical texts (and particularly in DN) this device is employed almost to the extent of cliché in the greater part of certain suttas.²⁵ A tendency towards repetition can be discerned in different levels of the text - from separate morphological, lexical, phraseological units to relatively long fragments including, sometimes, scores of paragraphs. E.g. a characteristic of classical Buddhist prose²⁶ is the repetition of certain words in different combinations (objects with the same verb, attributes with noun, etc.). In the very beginning of DN we find such stereotype descriptions of the Buddha, his followers etc.: mahatā bhikkhu = saṃghena saddhim pañca-mattehi bhikkhu satehi ("with a great company of the brethren, with about five hundred brethren - I 1.1 etc.); Buddhassa avannaṃ bhāsati... Buddhassa vannaṃ bhāsati ("speaking in dispraise of the Buddha, in dispraise of the Doctrine, in dispraise of the Order... in praise of the Buddha, in praise of the Doctrine, in praise of the Order... - ibid.); samagārāmo samagga = rato samagga = nandī samagga = karaniṃ vācam bhāsita ("a peacemaker, a lover of peace, impassioned for peace..." I 1.9); kāla = vādī bhūta = vādī attha = vādī dhamma = vādī vināya = vādī ("in season he speaks, in accordance with the facts he speaks, words full of meaning he speaks, on religion he speaks, on the discipline of the Order he speaks - ibid.). Cf. also I 3.74: Attha = jālan... Dhamma = jālan... Brahma = jālan... Ditthi = jālan;²⁷ II 1: Ramanīyā... ratti, abhirūpa... ratti, dassanīyā... ratti, pāsādikā... ratti, lakkhāṇa... ratti; II 102: khatāyam bhikkhave rāja, upahatāyam bhikkhave rājā. In this connection another similar device can be mentioned - a consecutive use of words, synonymically close to each other, with possible sound repetitions on lower (particularly morphological) levels - for example: abhisandeti parisandeti paripureti parippharati ("his very body does he so pervade, drench, permeate and suffuse with joy - II 75 sq.; cf. XXII 18 etc.).²⁸ On the other hand the antonymous pairs are

also usual - some of them enter the enumerations of logical possibilities (see above) and for their part contain certain repetitions on different levels. Cf. for example: samudayañ ca atthagamañ ca assādañ ca ādinavañ ca ("rising up and passing away...sweet taste...danger" - I 1.36 sq.); ekacca = sassatikā ekacca = asassatikā (Eternalists...non = Eternalists - I 2.1 sq.); sukhe dukkhe ("and ease and pain" - II 89); dibbe ca mānuse ca, ye dūre santike ca ("both human and celestial, whether far or near" - II 89); sa = rāgam... vīta = rāgam... ("the passionate... the calm..." - II 91-92) etc.²⁹ Such constructions, when "unfolded", can often result in a certain parallelism of separate paragraphs and parts of the sutta, which differ one from another only by corresponding elements (cf. below).

Besides certain formulas common to different texts (like e.g. evam me sutam in the very beginning) DN contains numerous phrase repetitions, within the frames of separate suttas and their fragments. Such are anaphoras yathā vā pañ'eke bhonto samāna = brāhmaṇā... in every paragraph of I 1.11-27; idha bhikkhave ekacco samāno vā brāhmaṇo vā (in I 1.31-34) and so on. There are refrains like: iti vā hi bhikkhave putthujāno Tathāgataṃ vannaṃ vadamāno vadevya (I 1.8-27); idam pi'ssa hoti sīlasamim (II 42-63 etc.). A stereotype description of the Buddha's qualities often is repeated: tam kho pana Bhagavantam Gotamaṃ evaṃ kalyāṇo kitti = saddo abbhugato... ("And this is the good report that has been noised abroad as to Gotama the Blessed One" - II 8; III 1.2; IV 6; XIII 7 etc.; cf. XXVI 25 etc.). Some repetitions evidently fulfil certain narrative functions, ensuring a kind of retardation in descriptions of personages and situations; in admonitions, speeches and replies, which are repeated partially or in full, sometimes with certain variations - cf. for example: I 1.1-4; 2.17-20, 24-25; 3.32-44, 45-57, 58-70; II 2-7, 16, 18-19, 21-22 etc. (where in the exposition of different doctrines only intermediate paragraphs - 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32 differ more substantially); 83-84, 85-88, 87-88, 89-90, 91-92 etc.; III 1.12-13; 2.3; IV 5-6 (= V 6-7); V 12, 16 sq; VI 6-7, 8-9, 10-11; VIII 6-12; X 1.2-4; XI 67-81; XII 2, 4-6, 8, 16-18; XIII 4-5, 8 sq., 31-32, 80; XV 4 sq.; XVI 3.2-5 sq. etc. Some of these variations are, for their part, connected with certain devices. Such is the gradual addition of the elements enumerated in V 23 sq. ("perpetual gift" - "perpetual gift" + "putting up of a dwelling place" - "perpetual gift" + "putting up of a dwelling place" + "taking the Buddha and the Truth and the Order as one's guide" etc.). In a similar manner VIII 22 repeats in progression (from 1 to 10) the qualities of the Buddha's sermon. As was mentioned above separate repetitions include rather large parts of the text, sometimes unifying different suttas - cf. the sīla sections in II-XIII (see above); IX 35 = XIII 19; IX 37 = XIII 21; XVI 1.16-17 = XXVIII 1-2 etc. Corresponding variations often refer to a specific set of

concepts, pertinent to the admonition. This principle was already testified in respect of other Pāli texts³⁰ and beyond the Buddhist tradition as well.³¹

The device of repetition is closely connected with the functions of the Pali Canon and the character of its tradition. We must remember that a major part of the Canon served an admonition transmitted orally.³² To keep it in mind one had to resort to mnemonic devices, doubtlessly fulfilled by some of these repetitions - particularly of specific formulas and rules of dogmatic importance. At the same time, the repetition of separate fragments led to a certain monotony which could presumably result in a kind of "fascinating" effect and thus facilitate the listener's concentration.³³ Such repetitions, generally typical of sacred texts, can also lead to certain elements of magical practice - particularly in cases where their composition is motivated by a certain number symbolism: cf. for example: some threefold repetitions mentioned above (III 1.20; XI 1.3; 81-83; XIII 11 sq. etc.).

All this certainly does not exclude the factor of the redactor's work as the possible cause of some repetitions. In order to make the exposition more complete, the redactor could use different versions of the same text one after the other - cf. for example VII presenting an abridged variant of VI; XVI 1.15-17 and XXVIII 1-2, or beyond the frames of DN - suttas 124-126 and 191-192 of the Saṃyutta Nikāya. The material of different collections could also be plagiarised which helps to explain certain parallels between separate canonical books (e.g. between the second part of DN and separate suttas of the Majjhima Nikāya).³⁴

DN abounds with comparisons that make the Buddha's admonitions rather vivid and picturesque.³⁵ One can divide them conditionally into two classes (both are frequent enough but it is not always easy to make a fine distinction between them). The first is represented by short laconic similes close to metaphors; the second by a more or less developed situation, sometimes "unfolded" into a kind of parable illustrating a specific precept. Among the examples of the first kind one can mention the images of the lion's roar (sīhanāda - describing the Buddha's sermon: VIII 22, 24; XXVIII 1), a string of blind men clinging one to the other (about the brāhmaṇas versed in the three Vedas - XIII 15), a waterless desert, a pathless jungle etc. (XIII 36), a lotus flower (XIV 1.34; cf. XXI 5 etc.), a tangled skein, a matted ball of thread etc. (XV 1), a mirror (XVI 2.8), a lamp (XVI 2.26), a figure made of gold (XVIII 17), different animals (XXVI 20), butter, honey, comb etc. (XXVII 14), moonshine (XXXI 6), brigands (XXXII 9) etc. A number of metaphors occur among the Buddha's 32 signs - rounded shells, antelope's legs, lion's jaw, cow's eyelashes etc. (cf. XIV 1.32; XXX 1.2).

"Unfolded" comparisons are often introduced by a formula: seyyathā' pi ...evam eva... ("just...as when...just so..."). Such is the image of a fisherman (I 3.72). A man freed from passions is likened to a debtor who has paid off his debt; a patient who has recovered from disease; a prisoner who is set free from his bonds; etc. (II 69). The brāhmana who does not know the way to Brahman, but tries to speak of it, is like a man who speaks about his love for the most beautiful woman in the land, but can say nothing about her progeny or her name and does not know whether she is tall or short, dark or blonde, etc. - in other words, who loves a woman he has not seen and does not know. He is likened, further, to an architect who begins to erect a staircase at the crossroads in order to mount to the upper storey of the mansion, but does not know where this mansion will be situated, how high it will be etc. (IX 35,37; cf. XIII 19,21). We find here comparisons with products received from the cow (IX 52); with a bird that helps sailors find land in the open sea (XI 85); with crossing the river (XIII 24 sq.); with a precious stone through which a string is threaded (II 84; XIV 1.21 etc.); with a man plunged in a pit of mire (XXIII 9 sq.); with a gamester who has swallowed poisoned dice (XXIII 27); etc. Some of these comparisons are in fact similar to short tales of a parable type - cf. for example XXIII 13 - about the brāhmana wife who killed an unborn infant in her own womb; XXIII 29 - about a man seeking for treasure; etc. Such digressions can be placed in a successive line (cf. II 69 sq.; XXIII 9 sq.). Some of them are correlated, presenting positive and negative variants of the same image - cf. for example IX 37 and 46 concerning the already mentioned ignorant architect and an expert one who knows all about the building.

Apart from the artistic function of this device, one should pay attention to the cultural importance of separate comparisons. We find here interesting data on ancient Indian life, on manners and occupations of different estates - brāhmanas, warriors, merchants, artisans etc.³⁶ At the same time, the choice of certain objects is evidently not arbitrary but motivated by Buddhist symbolism. Such are the images of a lotus (II 80; XXI 1.5 etc.); the crossing of a river (XIII 24, 26, 29); a gem (maṇi - cf. II 84 etc.); an elephant (XXI 1.5); etc.³⁷

Suttas of DN present examples of relatively developed narrative techniques.³⁸ An important function is performed here by dialogue, sometimes rather lively and dramatic. Such is, for example, the Buddha's conversation with young Ambaṭṭha (III). It is not restricted to pure didactics, but passes through different stages in the course of which Ambaṭṭha's pride and arrogance is replaced first by fear and finally by respect. The mood of his followers changes respectively, while the Buddha's replies are, accordingly, charged with emotion

and are connected with these states. At the same time the general tendency and function of the dialogue remains the same: teaching genuine knowledge. The Buddha's discourses can be compared in this respect with the exposition in the early Upanisads - where the dialogue, likewise, develops into a monologue preaching the Truth.

Each sutta begins with the stereotype words, evam me sutam ("Thus have I heard"). According to tradition, me refers here to the Buddha's favourite pupil, Ānanda, which cannot be correct in the case of certain suttas: e.g. in X the preceptor is not the Buddha, but Ānanda himself; while in XXIII this function is fulfilled by another pupil of the Buddha, Kassapa, whom Ānanda could scarcely esteem as his teacher (cf. also XXXIII and XXXIV). Me can evidently refer here to different persons who followed corresponding traditions of the doctrine, from preceptor to pupil - a process testified by the formula itself.³⁹

The most usual initial point of the plot (especially in the first part of DN) is the arrival of the Buddha and the monks following him (their traditional number is five hundred) at a certain place - Kosala, Aṅga, Māgadha etc. One of the local inhabitants - often a certain brāhmana authority or his pupil (Pokkharasādi, Kassapa, Subha etc.); this rôle is performed also by Ajātasattu, King of Māgadha - hears of the Buddha's arrival and approaches him in order to elucidate a certain question. As a rule, he supports a wrong view. The Buddha begins to admonish him and eventually refutes his delusions, whereupon the opponent, being satisfied, asks for reception into the Order. This general scheme is subject to specific variations. Thus, in III the Buddha admonishes young Ambaṭṭha first and then the latter's teacher, Pokkharasādi. Sometimes he teaches two interlocutors at the same time: Mandissa and Jāliya in VII, Vāsetṭha and Bhāradvāja in XIII. As we have previously stated, the teaching in X is presented by Ānanda and in XIII by Kassapa. Usually, the Buddha is not only surrounded by pupils and attendants but by opponents as well, and the latter are not always passive - at times they react quite emphatically to the Buddha's teaching (cf. III). So, for example, some brāhmanas are discussing whether their colleague Sonadanda should approach the Buddha or not (IV 4 sq.; cf. V 5 sq.), while Sonadanda himself is afraid of their disapproval (IV 8 sq.).

In his sermons the Buddha often inserts tales about the origin of the Sakya tribe (III 1.16), the sacrifice of King Mahāvijita (V 10-20), etc. Sometimes he refers to a corresponding precedent in his own life (cf. VIII 23; XXIV 1.7 sq., 11 sq.). One can easily trace here the frame-composition which is subject to certain variations. Such, for example, is the Buddha's repeated precept of II-XIII. In II 40-98 this precept is inserted into an admonition

to King Ajātasattu; while in III 1.2 sq.; IV 23 sq.; and VIII 18 sq. it is exposed in a similar manner, when illustrating the image of the brāhmaṇa who has reached the perfect state (cf. also X 1.7-2, 36 where the narration is divided into three parts). In other suttas we find variants ensuring additional functions of the precept repeated. In V 27 it is inserted into the tale about the "sacrifice" which is more fruitful than all other traditional sacrifices (cf. similar motifs in Upanisadic dogmatics). In VI 16-19 (= VII 2-5) it is the part of the conversation with Mahāli - the Buddha recalls here one of his previous sermons to two wanderers to whom he depicted, with the help of this precept, the state of a monk who does not ask improper questions (as these wanderers did, by questioning him about the difference between the life principle - *jīvan* and the body). IX 7-17 uses it as an exposition of self-training leading to certain states of consciousness and in the end - to the cessation of consciousness. In XI 8 sq. the realisation of this precept is the third and the highest of the Buddha's wonders (in the exposition of the three kinds of his wonders). In XII 19 sq. it serves as the admonition of a preceptor, belonging to the highest sort (in the narrative about four kinds of teachers). Finally, in XIII 40 sq. it illustrates the state of an adept knowing the way to union with Brahma and having the same signs as Brahma (in dialogue with Vasettha where the Buddha expresses the imperfection of brāhmaṇas versed in the three Vedas but not knowing the right way to Brahma).

The frame-composition is generally preserved in the second and third parts of DN (particularly thanks to traditional initial points and tail-pieces). At the same time, in comparison with the first part, we find here certain new traits. The rôle of narration, its specific gravity, grows here considerably. Accordingly, XIV contains the story of the Buddha's previous births (near to the genre of *Apadāna*) - a new detail of dogmatics, absent in the first part. XVI speaks of the last days of the Buddha and of events that followed immediately after his death - the text being perhaps a contamination of different legends, reminds one of the genre of chronicle (separate fragments of which it probably preserved); for the dogmatics is interwoven here with narration that is somewhat dramatic and emotional. XVII is closely associated with the previous sutta. The device of a frame is executed by talk between the Buddha and Ānanda regarding the place of the Buddha's future burial. During this conversation the Buddha relates the story of one of his previous births, containing elements of a fairy tale (cf. the description of the town Kusāvati). Similar traits are found in the next XVIII-XXI suttas, where a prominent rôle is played by mythological personages⁴⁰ (in the first part such personages are introduced but rarely - cf. the appearance of the yakkha Vajira-pāṇi before Ambaṭṭha in III 1.21 or of different gods in XI 68). Another pecu-

liarity can be observed in the exposition of XXI, the first section of which alternates prose and verses and includes a love episode (1.6-7).

As we see in DN suttas, the mode of exposition, the development of plot, and certain compositional traits suffer considerable changes in separate parts.⁴¹ One can add that these differences concern also the principles of denomination. Omitting more specific details, we can distinguish here two particular principles: that pertaining to certain traits of the contents, and that pertaining to the hero's name. In the first part the former principle is used only in I (Brahmajāla containing a metaphorical description), II (Sāmaññaphala) and XIII (Tevijja), while in III-XII the titles are based on the names of the Buddha's interlocutors (Ambaṭṭha, Sonadanda, Kūṭadanta etc.) with a single complication in VIII (Kassapa = *sīhanāda*: name + a metaphor of the Buddha's sermon). In the second part the situation is to a certain extent reversed: the majority of its suttas (6) are, in one or another way, denominated after their contents (XIV-XVI, XX-XXII - cf. above on *mahā*=) and four after heroes' names (XVII-XIX; XXIII: Mahāsudassana, Janavasabha etc.). Such names are still more rare in the titles of the third part - cf. XXIV (Pātika) and XXVI (Sigālovāda). The other titles are somehow or other connected with contents, being at the same time (like the corresponding suttas themselves) rather heterogeneous. So, for example, we find here geographical names (the park Udumbarika in XXV, presumably the town Ātānāṭa in XXVII), figurative expressions (*sīhanāda* in XXV, XXVI; cf. also XXVIII, XXIX etc.). The titles of XXXIII (Saṅgīti) and XXXIV (Dasottara) are based, strictly speaking, more on the principle of exposition than on the contents. As it was said, the parts themselves (Sīlakkhandavagga - Mahāvagga - Pātikavagga) are named after different principles.

This variety, however, is combined with a certain constancy of motifs and heroes' images, which repeat themselves throughout the whole book. Such is, for example, the motif of the quest for Truth that makes people seek the Buddha. Some of his interlocutors are full of obedience and respect from the very beginning (like Ajātasattu). Others cling to their delusions and first oppose him (like Ambaṭṭha), though in the end they are all converted by him.⁴² Certain scenes, evidently characteristic of the Buddha's way of life and his surroundings, are repeated constantly - cf. for example, greeting the Buddha, approaching him, suggesting entertainment to him and his monks (III 2.19; V 30; XVI 4.5; etc.).

The stereotype characteristic of the Buddha, already mentioned above, constantly calls him an incomparable tutor of men, full of compassion and tolerance, abounding in wisdom etc. Among typical traits of his behaviour one can note his silence (*tunhi*) as a sign of consent - cf. III 2.19; IV 24; etc.⁴³ A

certain ambiguity is characteristic of him, his benevolence sometimes alternates with threats (e.g. to Ambattha; cf. evidently a traditional spell: sattadhā muddhā phalissati - "his head splits into pieces on the spot") pronounced by the Buddha in III 1.20 (cf. also V 21; XXIV 1.22 - a scene of Pātika's humiliation). Such an attitude, traced also in some Upanisadic texts (where it is expressed even more strongly),⁴⁴ lends a kind of ambivalence to the image of the founder of Buddhism.

At the same time, different suttas of DN depict the Buddha in various different manners (though somewhat consecutively). While in the first part of the book the Buddha's image is based mainly on the traits of "earthly", "everyday" character, the second (cf. already in XIV) adds the motif of his previous births. His attitude towards wonders also varies - cf. a negative approach in XI (see also VI 5 sq.) and, on the other hand, the plot of XXIV. The second and third parts present a kind of Buddha's "deification".⁴⁵ In this process (still more typical of later Mahāyāna trends) one can suggest - apart from possible typological affinities - certain influences of more archaic (particularly Vedic) mythological motifs and concepts.⁴⁶ These details do not exclude, however, numerous signs of everyday life, with which they are interwoven (e.g. in the list of the Buddha's 32 signs - XIV 1.32; XXX 1.2; cf. above).⁴⁷ All this provides, within the frames of DN, rich material on the earlier evolution of the Buddha's image and doctrine.⁴⁸ It is worthwhile to add here that, as regards corresponding analysis, we should be careful in speaking of the Buddha's "deification", since we inevitably use here such distinctive features as "man-God" and introduce, thus, certain theistic concepts evidently alien to Buddhism. As A. Prince puts it, the Buddha is not more "sanctified" in Mahāyāna than "humanised" in Hīnayāna. The concept of "Buddha-hood" as a complex of the Buddha's qualities cannot be explained by this opposition ("Manhood - godhead") - it is a specific concept, sui generis, within the frames of the corresponding system.⁴⁹

DN also contains interesting characteristics of other personages - pupils and followers of the Buddha (Ānanda, Kassapa), laymen converted by him (Sona-dāna, Pokkharasādi) etc.⁵⁰, presenting a combination of stereotype and individual traits. Vivid is the image of King Ajātasattu in II, who admires the moonlight, is not satisfied with his teachers, trembles before the Buddha, adores his son, and repents of his sins. We have already spoken about the dynamics of Ambattha's image, whose change of attitude is accompanied by changes in his followers' attitude towards him, that is, from support to criticism (III 1.17-22). His teacher Pokkharasādi suffers analogous evolution - from mistrust of the Buddha to entering the Buddha's Order. Corresponding characteristics reflect the ambiguity marked above in respect of the Buddha. It has already

been noted that some images are depicted with certain humour - e.g. the son of Pātika wanting to rise from his seat and being unable to do so (XXIV 1.20).⁵¹

Some of the stylistic and compositional traits noted above seem to be typical of the earlier stage of "scientific" description in ancient Indian literature, as reflected in its ethical and philosophical texts - cf., for example, certain parallels in Vedic canonic style, particularly that of the early Upanisads.⁵² At the same time some of these devices - such as frame-composition, a system of definite metaphors etc. - are developed in later Indian literary tradition - both Buddhist (cf. genre of Jātakas) and Hindu ("framed story", certain poetic genres etc.).

NOTES

- 1 Cf. in this connection: L. Renou, J. Filliozat L'Inde classique II, Paris 1953, p. 516 sq.; C. Ragamey "Le problème du Bouddhisme primitif et les derniers travaux de Stanislaw Schayer", Rocznik Orientalistyczny XXI, 1957, p. 38 sq.; E. Conze Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, New York 1968, p. 1 sq., 10 sq. See also: H. Oldenberg "Studien zur Geschichte der buddhistischen Kanon", Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften (Philol. hist. Klasse), Göttingen 1912, p. 209; R. O. Franke "The Buddhist Councils at Rājagaha and Vesālī as alleged in Cullavagga XI, XII", JPTS 1908, p. 75; *idem*, "Der dogmatische Buddha nach dem Dīgha-nikāya", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XXVIII, 1914, p. 331 sq.; O. Strauss Indische Philosophie, Munich 1925, p. 87; L. de La Vallée Poussin Bouddhisme, opinion sur l'histoire de la doctrine, Paris 1925, p. 49; T. Y. Elizarenkova, V. N. Toporov The Pāli Language, Moscow 1976, p. 22, etc.
- 2 Cf. Franke "The Buddhist Councils", p. 66; *idem* "Die Buddha-lehre in ihrer erreichbar-ältesten Gestalt (im Dīghanikāya)", ZDMG 69, 1915, p. 455 sq.; 71, 1917, p. 50 sq.; DN, tr. R. O. Franke, Göttingen 1913, p. ix sq. (DF). T. W. Rhys Davids Buddhist India, London 1916, p. 188; A. B. Keith Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, Oxford 1923, p. 17 sq.; B. C. Law "Chronology of the Pāli Canon", Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 12, Part 2, 1931, p. 170 sq.; *idem* A History of Pāli Literature I, London 1933, p. 13 sq.; E. Frauwallner The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginning of Buddhist Literature, Rome 1956, p. 65 sq.; G. C. Pande Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, Allahabad 1957, p. 16 sq., etc.
- 3 See H. Oldenberg Zur Geschichte der altindischen Prosa. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der prosaisch-poetischen Erzählung, Berlin 1917, p. 41; W. Geiger Pāli Literature and Language, Calcutta 1956, p. 2; Elizarenkova, Toporov, p. 21.

- 4 Cf. P.V.Bapat "The different strata in the literary material of the Dīgha Nikāya", Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 8, Part 1, 1926, p.1 sq. These principles are different in the other canonical books as well (e.g. in Majjhima Nikāya - cf. M.Winternitz A History of Indian Literature II, Calcutta 1933, p.56).
- 5 DN suttas are signified here by Roman numerals according to their order: I - Brahmajāla, II - Sāmaññaphala, III - Ambaṭṭha, IV - Sonadanda, V - Kūṭadanta, VI - Mahāli, VII - Jāliya, VIII - Kassapa-sīhanāda, IX - Potṭhapāda, X - Subha, XI - Kevaddha, XII - Lohicca, XIII - Tevijja, XIV - Mahāpadāna, XV - Mahānidāna, XVI - Mahāparinibbāna, XVII - Mahāsudassana, XVIII - Janavasabha, XIX - Mahāgovinda, XX - Mahāsamaya, XXI - Sakka-pāṇha, XXII - Mahāsatipatthāna, XXIII - Pāyāsi, XXIV - Pātika, XXV - Uḍumbarika-sīhanāda, XXVI - Cakkavatti-sīhanāda, XXVII - Aggaṇṇa, XXVIII - Sampasādanīya, XXIX - Pāsādikā, XXX - Lakkhana, XXXI - Sigālovāda, XXXII - Ātānātiya, XXXIII - Saṅgīti, XXXIV - Dasuttara.
- 6 We refer here and below to DN edition: The Dīgha Nikāya, ed. by T.W.Rhys Davids and J.E.Carpenter, 3 vols, PTS 1890, 1903, 1910 (DRG) and translation: Dialogues of the Buddha, tr. by T.W. [and G.A.F.] Rhys Davids, 3 vols, PTS 1899, 1910, 1921 (DR).
- 7 Cf. about these repetitions, DR I, p.59.
- 8 Cf. Bapat, p.3. Another traditional explanation connects this title with the "great respect" surrounding these suttas. See: The Dīghanikāya, General Editor Bhikkhu J.Kashyap, Vol.II, Patna 1958, p.ix (UK).
- 9 J.Kashyap (UK III, p.ix) remarks that a more correct title should sound pāṭi-kādi (i.e. part beginning with Pātika Sutta) and that pātika is evidently used here in this sense.
- 10 Cf. Bapat, p.2 sq.
- 11 Cf. R.O.Franke "Die Cāthās des Dīghanikāya und ihren Parallelen", JPTS 1909, p.311 sq.; A.K.Warder Pali Metre, PTS 1967, particularly pp.16, 86, 94 sq., 98, 225; Elizarenkova, Toporov, p.62 sq.
- 12 Warder, 1967, p.94.
- 13 Ibid., p.226.
- 14 See DF, pp.xxx, xlii etc.; R.Franke "Das einheitliche Thema des Dīghanikāya", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XXVII, 1913, p.198 sq.; idem, "Der Verknüpfung der Dīghanikāya Suttas untereinander", ZMG 67, 1913, p.409 sq., etc.
- 15 Cf. Geiger, 1956, p.17 sq.; Renou, Filliozat, 1953, II, p.350 sq.

- 16 Franke "Der Verknüpfung", p.414 sq. (cf. his commentary in DF).
- 17 Ibid. pp.419-461.
- 18 Concerning similar enumerations see also A.Syrkin "On the beginning of the Sutta Pitaka (Brahmajāla Sutta)", Buddhist Studies. Ancient and Modern, ed. P.Denwood and A.Piatigorsky, London 1983, p.158. The device of such combinations is characteristic of other classical Indian treatises beyond the Buddhist tradition as well (cf. A.Syrkin "Notes on the Kāma Sūtra", Semiotica 11, No.1, 1974, p.35 sq.).
- 19a See T.W.Rhys Davids Buddhism. Its History and Literature, New York 1896: repr. Calcutta 1962, pp.31-33. Cf. A.Syrkin "On the beginning of the Sutta Pitaka", pp.157-8.
- 19 Cf. Franke "Die Buddhalehre", 1917, p.98.
- 20 See B.C.Law "Three refuges (tisaraṇa) in Buddhism", The Maha Bodhi 61, 5-6, 1953, p.155 sq.
- 21 Cf., for example, numerical lists in E.Conze Buddhist Meditation, London 1956, p.174 sq.
- 22 Cf. A.Syrkin, V.N.Toporov "La triade et la tétrade", Tel Quel, 1968, No.35, p.27 sq.; A.Syrkin "Čislovye komplekxy v rannix upaniṣadax", Trudy po znakovym sistemam IV, Tartu 1969, p.83 sq. (particularly analogies to Buddhist number symbolism).
- 23 See B.Heimann "Significance of numbers in Hindu philosophical texts", Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art VI, 1938, p.88 sq.; Syrkine, Toporov, p.30. Cf also notes on the structure of the Kumārapāṇha (Khuddakapāṇha), where similar gradation (1-10) is found, and some other texts - V.N.Toporov "Iz nabljudenij nad strukturoj nekotoryx buddijskix tekstov", Materialy po istorii i filologii Central'noj Azii 3, Ulan-Ude 1968, p.58 sq.
- 24 Cf. H.Oldenbergh Die Lehre der Upanischaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus, Göttingen 1923, p.302 (Anm.114); B.Heimann Studien zur Eigenart indischen Denkens, Tübingen 1930, p.181 sq.; T.G.Mainkar Some poetical aspects of the Rgvedic repetitions, Poona 1966; A.Ja.Syrkin "Zametki o stilistike rannix upaniṣad", Vestnik Drevnej Istorii, 1971, No.2, p.95, etc.
- 25 See Renou, Filliozat, II, p.338 sq.; E.Lamotte Histoire du Bouddhisme indien de l'origine à l'ère Śāka, Louvain 1958, p.157 sq.; Ju.M.Alixanova "Pitaka", Literatura drevnego Vostoka, Moscow 1971, p.167 sq.
- 26 Cf. Oldenbergh Zur Geschichte, p.42 sq.
- 27 Cf. Syrkine "On the beginning", p.163.
- 28 Cf. Alixanova, p.168

- 29 In this connection one can mention another characteristic trait of the Buddha's didactic style - that of negation. The latter is displayed in phraseology and techniques of discourse (cf. anaphoras in I 1.8, refrains in I 1.11 sq., II 97; IX 16 etc.) and can be traced in separate important concepts (nibbāna, anatta etc.). Cf. R.O.Franke "Der Negativismus in der alten Buddhalehre", Aufsätze zur Kultur- und Sprachgeschichte Vornehmlich des Orients E.Kuhn...gewidmet, Breslau 1916, p.336 sq.; M.Walleser "Der Buddhistische Negativismus", Zeitschrift für Buddhismus und verwandte Gebiete V, 1923-4, p.168 sq.; C.A.F.Rhys Davids "Buddhism and the Negative", JPTS 1924-27, p.237 sq.; M.Winternitz "Gotama the Buddha, what do we know of him and his teachings?", Archiv Orientalní I, 2, 1929, p.238; G.Grimm La religion du Bouddha, la religion de la connaissance, Paris 1944, p.161; G.H. Sasaki "The historical evolution of the concept of negation: nekkhamma and naikramya", JAOS 83, 1963, p.477 sq.; A.Wayman "The Buddhist 'Not this, Not this'", Philosophy East and West 11, 3, 1961, p.99 sq. See also concerning noteworthy parallels in the Upanisads (e.g. na iti in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. II 3.6; III 9.26, etc.; cf. ibid. III 8.8; IV 3.22; Śvetāśvatara Up. III 9-10, etc.), Śaṅkara, Candrakīrti and other traditions (beginning with Heraclitus) - B.Heimann "The significance of negation in Hindu philosophical texts", B.C.Law Volume II, Poona 1946, p.408 sq.; A.Ja.Syrkin Nekotorye problemy izučeniia upaniṣad, Moscow 1971, p.157 sq., etc.
- 30 See Toporov, p.54 sq. in respect of Dhammasaṅgani I 1.1. Cf. more detailed exposition in Syrkin "On the beginning", pp.161-2.
- 31 E.g. in description of "vital forces" (prāṇā) in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. IV 3.23-30; in Īśā Up. 9-14, etc. (Syrkin, "Zametki", p.94-5).
- 32 Cf. Geiger, p.11-12; A.Coomaraswamy Buddha and the Gospel of Buddha, London 1916, p.260; 274, etc.
- 33 Cf. Oldenberg Zur Geschichte, p.46 sq.
- 34 Geiger, p.12; cf. also concerning parallels in verses: Franke "Die Gāthās", p.311 sq.
- 35 See corresponding lists in: C.A.F.Rhys Davids "Similes in the Nikāyas", JPTS 1906-7, p.52 sq.; cf. also K.Hoppenworth Buddhistische Gleichnisse, speziell die Wievergleiche nach dem Majjhima-nikāya I, Hermannsburg 1972.
- 36 Winternitz A History II, p.75 sq.
- 37 Cf. in this connection: R.Sewell "Early Buddhist Symbolism", JRAS 18, 1988, p.364 sq.; G.Mensching Buddhistische Symbolik, Gotha 1929; C.A.F.Rhys Davids "Zur Geschichte des Rad symbols", Eranos Jahrbuch 1934, Zürich 1935, p.153 sq.; W.Kirfel Symbolik des Buddhismus, Stuttgart 1959; T.B.Karunaratne

- "Le symbole bouddhique de la roue", Samādhī, Cahiers d'études bouddhiques VI, 1, 1972, p.31 sq.; 3, p.120 sq.; B.G.Gokhale "Animal symbolism in early Buddhist literature and art", East and West N.S. 24, 1-2, 1974, p.111 sq., etc.
- 38 See Winternitz A History II, p.68 sq.; Law A History II, p.644; E.L.Clancy "The Buddha's teaching as literature", Vesak Sirisara Buddhist Annual 1959, Vol.XXIV, p.53 sq.
- 39 Cf. H.Kern Manual of Indian Buddhism, Strassburg 1896, p.2; L.de La Vallée Poussin Bouddhisme, opinion sur l'histoire de la dogmatique, Paris 1925, p.34; Geiger, p.10; J.Brough "Thus have I heard", Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies X, Part 2, 1956, p.416 sq.; S.Dutt The Buddha and Five After-centuries, London 1957, p.3 sq.
- 40 Cf. Bapat, p.2 sq.; E.Thomas The History of Buddhist Thought, London 1933, p.265 sq.
- 41 Cf. particularly corresponding characteristics in DK I, pp.xxii-xxvi; II p.xxv-xxvi; III pp.xx-xxii.
- 42 Cf. Franke "Das einheitliche Thema", p.190 sq.; 276 sq.; idem, "Der Buddha als 'ernst-bedeacht und vollbewusst'", Beiträge zur Literaturgeschichte und Geistesgeschichte Indiens. Festgabe H.Jacobi, Bonn 1926, p.327 sq.
- 43 It can be connected also with the well-known abstention from discussing metaphysical questions. See: Franke "Die Buddhalehre", 1915, p.456 sq.; T.W. Organ "The Silence of Buddha", Philosophy East and West 4, 2, 1954, p.125 sq.; K.Jaspers Die grossen Philosophen I, Munich 1957, p.225; Yoshinori Takenchi "The Silence of Buddha", Philosophical Studies of Japan VI, Tokyo 1965, p.43 sq.
- 44 One can note that Ambaṭṭha does not perish like Śākalya in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. III 9.26 (possibly because the former repented at the right time). Cf. Syrkin "Zametki", p.99.
- 45 Cf. Bapat, p.2 sq., 12. R.O.Franke ("Der dogmatische Buddha", p.355) suggests that the Buddha embodied the concept of the Deity participating in men's everyday lives. See also on the corresponding aspects of the Buddha's image: E.Senart Essais sur la légende du Buddha, son caractère et ses origines, Paris 1892; H.v.Glasenapp Brahma und Buddha, Berlin 1926; idem, Buddhismus und Gottesidee, Wiesbaden 1954; E.Lamotte "La légende du Buddha", Revue de l'histoire des religions 34, 1947-48, p.37 sq.; A.Bareau "The superhuman personality of Buddha and its symbolism in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra of the Dharmaguptaka", Myths and Symbols, Studies in honor of M. Eliade, Chicago 1969, p.9 sq. Cf. in this connection the notes of A.Prince (below, n.49).

THE PLACE OF AHIMŚĀ IN BUDDHA-DHAMMO

Bhikkhu Nāṇajīvako

(In memory of Richard Abeyasekera)

Nekkhamma-saṅkappo avyāpāda-saṅkappo
avihiṃsā-saṅkappo, ayam vuccati bhikkhave
sammā-saṅkappo.

Mahāsatipatthāna-suttantam (D XXII 21)

The intention of renunciation,
 the intention free of ill-will,
 the intention of non-violence,
 this is called, bhikkhus, the right intention.

I

In Pāli, non-violence is designated by the term ahimsā, as in Sanskrit (cf. Dh 225, 261, 270, 300; D XXX 1, 6,; S I 165, etc.), or by a-vi-himsā, an etymologically stronger term of the same stem, as in the definition of the second component of the Eightfold Path Leading to the Cessation of Suffering, quoted above (cf. D XXII 21; D XXXIII 1,9,10; 2.1 (XXIV); Sn 292; It IV 4,8, etc.).

In the short definition quoted above and most often in other texts on the Noble Eightfold Path, ahimsā is the climax of a threefold gradation of the same basic virtue of right intention.

In Jainism, the religion closest to Buddhism, considering itself to be the oldest on the high level of universal cultures (as it is still extant also in the pre-Biblical and pre-Islamic tradition of the ancient Arabia Felix), "ahimsā is the highest law" (ahimsā paramo dharmah). This is the only essential tenet which could be considered as its exclusive dogma. All the rest of its normative teaching are maxims deduced from this categorical imperative, tolerating also exceptions, since Jainism is the religion of extreme tolerance, defined as the "toleration of many modes of truth": "The faith in one truth or even in a plurality of truths, each simply given as determinate, would be rejected by it as a species of intolerance." ¹

The eightfold path of the Buddha starts from the stance taken against "the pursuance of views, adherence to views, jungle of views, contortion of views, vacillation of views, fetter of views" (M 2 and several other texts).

This critical prerequisite is the reason why the sifting of world-views (ditthi) and dogmatism is placed before ahimsā as a preliminary step on the

eightfold path of the Buddha. His "right views" do not consist of any dogmatically infallible propositions and beliefs, such as are dismissed in the oft-repeated warning against the affirmation "this only is true, all the rest is false". The best analysis of the shortcoming of his authoritarian opponents is given in Caṅki-suttam (M 95). The basic definition of "right views" (sammā ditthi) in our context underscores the purely existential restriction of the problem to which the intention of this first decisive step refers: "The understanding of suffering, the understanding of the origin of suffering, the understanding of the cessation of suffering, the understanding of the path leading to the cessation of suffering. This, bhikkhus, is called right view" (D 22 and other texts).

The Buddha often warned his worldly minded interlocutors (putthujjanā) against "untrustworthy teachers" who are used to "take and apply the correct criterion in such a way that, while it extend only to one side it excludes other...right criteria concerning good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct and good mental conduct". The Buddha taught the method of detecting such "unripe criteria" by independent mature thinking (Apannaka-suttam, M 60) - the best known instance of such advice is contained in the Kālāma-suttam (A III 65), in the Buddha's answer to the complaint:

- Some samaṇā and brāhmaṇā...expound only their own tenets while they abuse and rend and censure and rail at the tenets of others.
- Kālāmā, do not be satisfied with hearsay or with tradition or with legendary lore or with what has come down in your scriptures or with conjecture or with logical inference or with weighing evidence or with liking for a view after pondering over it or with someone else's ability or with the thought "The monk is our teacher". When you know in yourselves "These things are wholesome, blameless...then you should practise them and abide in them."

Such was the original teaching of the Buddha's Noble Truth on acquiring correct standpoints in an historical epoch of Indian culture considered still by modern scholars in comparison with the highest standard of European culture as an age of "Renaissance".

Swami Vivekananda, in a talk on "Buddha's Message to the World" (in San Francisco, 1900) boldly affirmed that 600 years B.C. "Indian civilization had already completed its growth". ² A few decades later the same assessment was confirmed by the best known European sociologist, Max Weber, who considered the atheist and caste-free Jainist and Buddhist movements at that time as "intellectualist heterodox soteriology" characteristic of the "drawing-room" elitist ideology in the cultural ambience of royal courts and cities. ³

In the later twentieth century a new and most brutal wave of Western penetration to the Asian East, reaffirming with its authoritarian dogmatism that "this only is truth, all the rest is false", often threatens with a direct attack the first step of our Noble Path. At the other end, the last and highest eighth step and attainment of samādhi is being sapped by the new wave of Western fashion in "meditation", advertising "shortcuts to Nirvāṇa" by eliminating not only the beginning but also the end of this Noble Path for the convenience of hippies. The next immediately endangered steps are the second - ahimsā - and the sixth, in the concluding section of the Path dealing with the contemplative attainment of jhānam, "right effort" - sammā vāyāmo. On this point I wish to underscore a recently ripened statement (agannaka dhamma) of one of the eldest gurus (or rather anti-guru in up-to-date anti-cultural terms), Krishnamurti: "Meditation is hard work. It demands the highest form of discipline - not conformity, not imitation, not obedience - but a discipline which comes through constant awareness.... Without laying the foundation of a righteous life, meditation becomes an escape and therefore has no value whatsoever. A righteous life is not the following of social morality, but the freedom from envy, greed and the search of power." ⁴

II

Historically, on the ground of several discourses of the Buddha, I consider the origin of Buddhism as an apostasy of Jainism at the time of Mahāvīra's conservative reform aiming at a purely formalistic rigorism. In the Buddha's discussions with and about Jains, a resolute break with their overloaded tradition is always strongly underscored, not to speak of the often obsessive commentarial expatiation on background stories. In comparison therewith, the Buddha's criticism of brahmanic traditions appears most often as a mild irony or rebuke for some more or less dangerous stupidity.⁵

On the other hand, the Buddha's renunciation of the same kind of ascetic penances, described even in formal details in terms identical with the practices of Jain munis,⁶ is still today most often superficially understood and discussed as an episode of exclusively negative and even misleading Jain influences on the samana Gotama, who before he became a buddha, had to break through them and liberate himself from this last "error" after all the aeons of strenuous endeavours to attain his ultimate perfection.

Richard Abeyasekera, in the course of 25 years of his dedicated work for the Buddhist Publication Society in Kandy, has published only one tiny booklet of his own. His recent death evoked in me the value and relevance of this meditation on "The Master's Quest for Light" for the subject of my long years of studies of the historical relations between Jainism and Buddhism.

The origin of the bad faith, praising Buddhism as an anti-ascetic religion appears at our time to be prevalently, though not exclusively, of "modern" Western origin. R. Abeyasekera begins his "Reflections" with singling out "amidst the great characteristics of the Bodhisatta...his boundless compassion, his indomitable courage and his unswerving allegiance to truth. To achieve the supreme knowledge of the Buddhas, the Master had to perfect himself through severe ordeals of suffering in his innumerable past lives."

All this superman's power personified in ascetic heroism was essential and imperative for the attainment of "firm control of mind" with which "he checked all inclinations to indolence..." Only through a relentless increasing of the ordeal of such self-inflicted penances "right through those long years of trial, this power to surmount every obstacle on his path to Enlightenment grew stronger in him".

R. Abeyasekera quotes a discourse with Sāriputta in which the Buddha confesses "to have practised the four kinds of ascetic life and discipline. Rigorous have I been in my ascetic discipline, rigorous beyond all others. Repulsive have I been in my ascetic practice; repulsive beyond measure. Scrupulous have I been in my ascetic life; I have practised the height of scrupulousness. Solitude have I sought in my practice of asceticism: the utmost extreme of solitude."

Unlike our age of backsliding degeneration, when all non-pleasurable efforts to improve one's character are labelled as the worst disease of "masochism", while its opposite, "sadism", is considered as the safest and preventive "panacea" against all suffering, the age in which the Buddha was born is sketched also by R. Abeyasekera as "an age of intense intellectual and spiritual activity. A time of religious unrest..., of bold investigation and high achievement in the realm of man's thought. Materially too it was no backward age. But it was essentially a time when the things of the spirit ... ranked higher than the seen, the material and the gross.... It was in fact the sight of an ascetic in yellow garb that showed the Master the way to solve life's misery and urged his renunciation.... His courage in these experiments (as described in the Mahā-saccaka-suttam, M 36) was marvellous... Then followed the supreme expression of strength in that last act of his struggle for light", when he realised to have attained the utmost limits of asceticism and "courageously abandoned them in the face of ridicule of his erstwhile admirers" (an allusion to the Dhammacakkapavattana-suttam, S V xii 11). And then "he took his seat of grass under the Bodhi tree at Gaya and boldly resolved: 'Let my flesh, bones and skin shrink and whiten and my blood dry up, yet I shall not lose strength in my endeavour. Never from this seat will I stir until I have attained full Enlightenment!'".

Obviously the result of his attainment was strictly proportioned, up

to the last moment of his struggle, to the climax of extreme efforts in ascetic self-mortification of the Bodhisatta "who had to perfect himself through severe ordeals of suffering in his innumerable past lives" - and not simply realising of his worst "mistake" at the last moment. This was explicitly admitted and underscored as the essential prerequisite in the Buddha's discourse on braving "the fears and terrors" of the forest-life (Bhayabherava-suttam, M 4):

"Suppose some monk or brahman is unpurified in bodily, verbal or mental conduct,... is subject to fright and horror,... unconcentrated and confused in mind, devoid of understanding ... - when such a monk or brahman resorts to a remote jungle-thicket abode in the forest, then owing to those faults he evokes unwholesome fear and dread. But... I have none of those defects. I resort to a remote jungle-thicket in the forest as one of the Noble Ones, who are free from these defects. Seeing in myself this freedom from such defects, I find great solace in living in the forest... I thought: But there are the specially holy nights... suppose I spent those nights in such awe-inspiring abodes... which make the hair stand up - perhaps I should encounter that fear and dread. And later I thought: Why do I dwell in constant expectation of the fear and dread? Why not subdue that fear and dread while maintaining the posture I am in when it comes to me? And while I walked... sat... lay down..., the fear and dread came upon me; but neither I stood nor sat... till I had subdued that fear and dread." 7

In the archaically deepest and most beautiful (and therefore most neglected) poem ascribed to the Buddha, on the symbol of "The Rhinoceros", the first, middle (21) and last (41) stanzas form the essential knots on which the whole texture is harmoniously knitted and woven. The climax is reached on the central point in the statement:

Escaped from the exhibitions of views,
arrived to the clearing, take the straight way:
"I have attained the wisdom not guided by others".
- Go alone as the rhinoceros.

(Sn 55)

Without having reached this point of clear orientation at the end of the thorny and tortuous pathless passage through the "jungle of views" and of misleading opinions, one will necessarily still remain with the lost orientation within the vicious circle of eternal reproduction and renewal of interdependent causes and intricate relations of paṭiccasamuppāda; torn by all the currents of the stream of samsāra, unable to swim across and ultimately stranded "pine away like old cranes in a lake without fish" (Dhp 155). Even a casual

visit to a buddha and a talk with him will remain useless and annoying - as in the classic case of Māluṅkyāputta (M 63), or recently in the most famous and romantically most attractive model skilfully shaped for the taste of our hippie youth by Hermann Hesse in the bodhisattva ideal of his Siddhartha.

III

(1) In the Buddha's discourses on the subject of ahiṃsā with Jain nigāṇṭhā (followers of his opponent Mahāvīra) the most conspicuous topic of discussion was the question of "the modes of action in doing evil deeds, namely: action of body, of word and of mind" (analysed most extensively in the Upāli-suttam, M 56).

Dīgha-Tapassī, the naked ascetic, a follower of Nigāṇṭha Nātaputta, the Mahāvīra, on one occasion visited the Buddha in Nālandā, and the latter asked him:

- Well, Tapassī, how many modes of action does Nigāṇṭha Nātaputta declare there are in evil acting and behaving?
- No, friend Gotama; the performed action is not declared by Nigāṇṭha Nātaputta to be an action, it is declared to be an offence.
- Well, Tapassī, how many modes of offence does he declare there are in evil acting and behaving?
- ... offence of body, of word and of mind.... Of these three offences... bodily offence is the most blamable. Verbal offence and mental offence are not so blamable.

On the contrary, according to the Buddha,

- Of these three actions (kammāni), thus analysed and differentiated, mental action, I declare, is the most blamable. Bodily action and verbal action are not so blamable....

When, on a later occasion, another follower of Mahāvīra, Upāli, insisted again on the same standpoint as Tapassī, the Buddha asked him:

- What do you think, householder? Suppose there were a naked ascetic with the four kinds of restraint; restrained as regards all evil.... He, while walking up and down, inflicts destruction upon many tiny creatures. Now, what does Nigāṇṭha Nātaputta declare is the result of this?
- He declares that what is unintentional is not blamable....
- And in which offence does Nātaputta recognise intention?
- In mental offence.
- Householder, householder, think carefully before you reply. This latter does not agree with your former statement that bodily offence is the most blamable, and not so the mental and the verbal offences....

In my attempts to verify this statement on the gradation of evil deeds in Jaina scriptures or oral tradition I have never come across any confirmation of the sequence insisted upon by Dīgha-Tapassī in the quoted text and repeated in other Buddhist references. The sequence confirmed in the subsequent Jaina tradition is always just the same as the Buddhist: mind-word-body, and there is no mention of its debatability at any time. As this was the time of deep religious reforms in several Jaina communities (among whom that of Pārśvāh, preceding Mahāvīra only about two centuries was the most authentic), we should not exclude the possibility that such discussions with the Buddha and his followers might have influenced the contemporary Jaina reformers - a problem that still might be worthy of further investigation in comparative studies of these two closely related and therefore historically antagonistic religions of ahimsā.

In the Jain Āyāranga-sūyam (Sk. Ācāraṅga-sūtram)⁶, in the first book, Bāmbha-cerāim (3,4,3), dealing with the training in ascetic discipline (brahma-caryā), the concluding statement - "There are degrees in injurious act, but there are no degrees in non-violence" - indicates, in its context, a deeper approach to the whole problem discussed in our context from the standpoint of the vicious circle of morally reprehensible effects.

(2) The Dhammapadam is the most popular collection of aphoristic verses attributed to the Buddha, occasionally taken out of his more extensive discourses. Like the Jātaka tales, some of these verses convey the archetypal symbols and their meaning from ancient Indian wisdom applied to Buddhist contexts. In Jainism, the Uttarajjhayana-sūyam (Sk. Uttarādhyayana-sūtram) in its 36 chapters comes closest to the genre of both the 26 chapters of the Dhammapadam and the more extensive collection of 1149 stanzas, interwoven with tales and dialogues, in the Sutta-nipāta. Some of these verses, contained sometimes in chapters under analogous headings in both the Dhammapadam and Uttarajjhayana-sūyam, correspond to each other not only in analogous but also in homologous sequences of several stanzas. In the following selection of Dhammapadam verses we shall begin with a few examples confirming this analogy.

The title of the eighth chapter of the Dhammapadam is "The Thousands" (Sahassa-vagga). The following stanzas correspond closely to the same style and contents of utterances ascribed to King Nami, a patteya-buddha (Pāli pacceka-buddha) of Jaina tradition, after his pavvajjā (Pāli pabbajjā, 'escape' from the world) at the beginning of chapter IX of Uttarajjhayana-sūyam:

Dhammapadam

If a man were to conquer in battle
a thousand times a thousand men,
and another conquer one, himself,

Uttarajjhayana-sūyam

Though a man were to conquer
thousands and thousands enemies,
greater will be his victory

he indeed is the greatest of
conquerors.

if he conquers only himself.

Conquest of self is indeed better
than the conquest of other persons;
of one who has disciplined himself,
who always practises self-control.

(103-4)

Fight with yourself; why fight with
other enemies? He who conquers
himself through himself,
will obtain happiness

(34-35)

If a man month after month for a hundred
years should sacrifice a thousand offer-
ings, and if he only for one moment
would honour a man with a developed
self, that honour is, indeed, better
than a century of sacrifice.

(106)

If a man should offer every month
thousands and thousands of cows,
better will he be who controls him-
self, though he gives no offering.

(40)

Let a fool month after month
eat his food with a kusa-grass
blade: nevertheless he is not worth
the sixteenth part of those who have
well understood the Truth (dhamma).

(70)

If a fool should eat with a kusa-
grass blade, the merit of his
penance will not be equal the
sixteenth part of his who possesses
the Truth as it has been taught.

(44)

The last, XXVI, chapter of the Dhammapadam (Brāhmaṇa-vagga) contains a sequence of stanzas ending with the refrain: "Him I call a brāhmaṇa" (tam ahaṃ brūmi brāhmaṇaṃ). In the XXV chapter of the Uttarajjhayana-sūyam a sequence of 16 stanzas (19-34) end with the refrain: "Him we call a brāhmaṇa". The following few samples are characteristic for our analogy:

Him I call a brāhmaṇa who does not hurt
by body, speech or mind, who is con-
trolled in these three things. (391)

Him I call a brāhmaṇa who has laid aside
the rod with regard to beings,
whether weak or strong,
who neither kills nor lets others kill.

(405)

Him we call a brāhmaṇa who thoroughly
knows living beings,
whether they move or not,
and does not injure them
in any of the three ways
(by thoughts, words and acts).

(23)

Independently of such implications the word ahimsā occurs in the following aphorisms of the Dhammapadam:

The silent sages abstaining from violence (ahimsakā),
always restrained in body, go to the state
from which they never relapse, whither gone they never grieve.

(225)

- (7) Some Jātaka tales were also motivated by the same virtue and intention to illustrate the application of ahimsā in daily life.

NOTES

- 1 Cf. K.C. Bhattacharya The Jaina Theory of Anekānta in his Studies in Philosophy I, Calcutta 1956. § 30, p.343.
- 2 The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda VIII. 3rd ed., Calcutta 1959, p.92.
- 3 Max Weber Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie II. Hinduismus und Buddhismus. Tübingen 1921, pp.170-250. (Cf. a recent English translation.)
- 4 J. Krishnamurti Meditations, Madras 1980, p.6.
- 5 My main Yugoslav work on "the medians of Asian philosophies" (Razmeda azijskih filozofija I, Part 2 on "Jainism and Buddhism", chapter 5 a-c, pp.173-95. Ed. "Liber", Zagreb 1978) contains a survey of Pāli texts on the Buddha's discussions with Jains and some texts characteristic of his attitude to brāhmanas. Suttas most characteristic of the sharpness of their controversy are: M 56 Upāli, M 58 Abhaya-rājakumāra, and M 104 Sāmagāma (on the occasion of Mahāvīra's death). Discussions and critiques of the Jaina doctrines of unlimited and always present absolute knowledge of a tirthakarah (kevala-jñānam) and the extreme limits of ascetic restraint (saṃvara) are described in M 71 Tevijja-vacchagotta, M 76 Sandaka, M 101 Devadaha and some minor texts in Aṅguttara and Saṃyutta-nikāyas. Characteristic of the Buddha's ironic rebuke of brāhmanas are, amongst others: M 51 Kandaraka - on the four types of men (the first, "torturer of himself" is the Jain ascetic, the third, "torturer of both himself and others" is the brāhman performing sacrifices for a king and the king himself); D 31 Sigālovāda (the stupidity of literal understanding of ritualistic texts), and D 4 Saṇḍaṇḍa (the self-conceit of a mighty brāhman).
- 6 Most of the specific penances practised by the Buddha immediately before his spiritual awakening at Uruvelā were specifically and peculiarly according to the Jain tradition. They are described in M 12 Mahā-sīhanāda-sutta and other texts from the same period of his struggle for awakening. The similarities of both teachings, Jain and Buddhist, are most strikingly presented in two beautiful poems included in the Sutta-nipāta: "The Rhinoceros" (Khaggavisāna) and Muni suttas - describing the ascetic attitude of a Jain muni (silent sage) as opposed to the traditional and institutionalised Buddhist "priest".
- 7 This and some of the preceding quotations are from Bhikkhu Nānamoli's The Life of the Buddha (BPS, Kandy 1972). Underlinings are mine.
- 8 The texts in the sequel are taken from H. Jacobi Jaina Sūtras, SBE 22 and 45, 2nd ed., Delhi 1964. Discrepancies between translations from Prākṛit and Pāli in analogous texts are partly due to my impossibility of consulting original Prākṛit editions.
- 9 Cf. T.W. Rhys Davids, SBE, Part III, p.198. PTS, London 1921.

UDDAKA RĀMAPUTTA AND RĀMA

Peter Skilling

The story of the Bodhisatta's quest for Enlightenment is related in identical terms in four Pāli discourses of the Middle Collection: the Discourse on the Exalted Quest (Ariya-pariyesana-sutta), the Greater Discourse to Saccaka (Mahā-saccaka-sutta), the Discourse to Prince Bodhi (Bodhi-rāja-kumāra-sutta) and the Discourse to Saṅgārava (Saṅgārava-sutta) (Majjhima Nikāya 26, 36, 85 and 100.¹) An important section of this account deals with the Bodhisatta's meeting with and study under two contemporary teachers of yogic or ecstatic techniques, Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta. The similarities of the accounts of these meetings in the Pāli have led several translators to gloss over important differences between them and treat them as virtually identical, with a mere substitution of names. Such is entirely the case with the late I.B. Horner's English translation of the Discourse on the Exalted Quest (Middle Length Sayings I, PTS 1967, pp. 207-210), and, to a lesser degree, with Bhikkhu Nānamoli's translations of the Discourse to Prince Bodhi and the Discourse on the Exalted Quest (A Treasury of the Buddha's Words, Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press, Bangkok: I pp.273-6, III pp.201-4 - see book review on p.117).

The main difference is one of tense change: while in the account of the first meeting Ālāra Kālāma is spoken of in the present tense, in the account of the second meeting Uddaka Rāmaputta is spoken of in the present, but Rāma is spoken of in the aorist or past tense. This tense change makes it clear that Uddaka Rāmaputta and Rāma are not one and the same person, as given in the above-mentioned translations, but that Uddaka is the disciple, either the spiritual or real son (putta) of the deceased teacher Rāma.

In the passage in question, the Buddha relates how he, as a bodhisatta, met Ālāra Kālāma, mastered his teaching - the attainment of the plane of nothingness - and then, because it did not lead to Enlightenment, rejected it. He then went to Uddaka Rāmaputta; on being accepted into Uddaka's community, he quickly mastered the teaching verbally and intellectually. The Buddha then goes on to relate - the whole account is in the first person - as follows: "I, then thought, 'It was not out of mere faith that Rāma taught (pavedesi/pavedeti)² this dharma, saying 'I dwell having attained, having realised by my own direct knowledge'; I am certain that Rāma dwelt (viḥasi/viḥarati) knowing and seeing this dharma'. I then went to Uddaka Rāmaputta and asked, 'What is the extent, sir (āvuso, vocative), of the dharma that Rāma (Rāmo, nominative)³ taught, having attained it, having realised it by his own direct knowledge?' On being asked this, Uddaka Rāmaputta instructed me in the plane of neither perception nor non-perception.

I then thought, 'Rāma had (ahosi/atthi) no monopoly on faith: I too possess faith; Rāma had no monopoly on energy, mindfulness, concentration or wisdom: I too possess energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom. Let me then exert myself in order to realise the dharma that Rāma taught, saying "I dwell having attained, having realised by my own direct knowledge".' And not long afterwards, indeed quickly, I dwelt having attained to that dharma, having realised it by my own direct knowledge, I then went to Uddaka Rāmaputta, and asked, 'Is this the extent, sir (āvuso, voc.), of the dharma that Rāma (Rāmo, nom.) taught, having attained it, having realised it by his own direct knowledge?' When he answered in the affirmative, I said, 'I too dwell having attained to this dharma to the same extent, having realised it by my own direct knowledge'. (And Uddaka Rāmaputta said,) 'It is a blessing, sir, it is indeed a blessing that I should meet with a companion in the spiritual life such as you! You now dwell having attained to, having realised by your own direct knowledge, the dharma that Rāma taught, having attained to it and having realised it by his own direct knowledge ...the dharma that Rāma knew (aññāsi/jānāmi), you know...as was (ahosi/---) Rāma, so are you....Come then, sir: may you lead this community!'

A difference in status between the two individuals, Ālāra and Uddaka, is revealed in the concluding parts of the accounts of the two meetings, where another important difference occurs. When the Bodhisatta informs Ālāra Kālāma that he has mastered the latter's teaching, Ālāra, after proclaiming the Bodhisatta to be his equal, says, "Come then, sir: let the two of us lead this community together". In his narration of this event, the Buddha remarks, "Thus Ālāra Kālāma, my teacher (ācariya), set me, his disciple (antevāsīn) on equal footing with himself, and honoured me with the highest of honours". In the account of the second meeting, however, after Uddaka has proclaimed the Bodhisatta to be the equal of Rāma, he says, "Come then, sir: may you lead this community" (see translation above). Of this the Buddha remarks, "Thus Uddaka Rāmaputta, my companion in the spiritual life (sābrahmacārin) established me in the position of teacher (ācariyatthāne), and honoured me with the highest of honours"⁴. This implies that, while Ālāra was accepted as a teacher in his own right, Uddaka was simply the leader of a community through succession, by virtue of his teacher's death.

The relationship between Uddaka Rāmaputta and Rāma is borne out by two accounts of the second meeting preserved in Chinese. The first, from a discourse of the Sarvāstivādin school, describes Rāma as the father of Uddaka; the second, from the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptaka school, describes Rāma as Uddaka's teacher, and states specifically that Uddaka started teaching after the death of his teacher, Rāma (both passages translated and discussed by A. Bareau in Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha dans les Sūtrapitaka et les Vinayapitaka anciens I,

EFEO, Paris 1963, pp.23-27).

Of the extant Sanskrit texts dealing with the Bodhisatta's meeting with Uddaka, who is variously referred to in Buddhist Sanskrit texts as Uddaka, Uddaka, Udraka and Rudraka, the Mahāvastu of the Lokottaravādin school, in what is certainly an ancient passage, also makes this relationship clear. While the Bodhisatta addresses Uddaka as "bho Udraka"⁵ ("good Udraka"), the latter speaks of "the good Rāma" in a way that clearly implies that Rāma was his teacher. Thus he says, "Just so much, good Gautama, was attained, realised and taught by the good Rāma (bhavatā Rāmena): the plane of neither perception nor non-perception". When the Bodhisatta announces that he has also attained to this plane, Uddaka replies, "Then the good Gautama knows that same dharma which the good Rāma (bhavām Rāmo) knew (jānāti: third person, "historical present"). (Mahāvastu Avadāna 2, ed. R. Basak, Sanskrit College, Calcutta 1965, pp.167-9.) Unfortunately, the English translation of this passage is faulty, and implies that Uddaka and Rāma are one person, as do the translations from Pāli (J. Jones The Mahāvastu 2, SBB, London 1952, p.116-7).

The account given in the Lalita-vistara (ed. P. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Mithila Institute, Darbhanga 1958, p.180-1) seems to have undergone the same confusion as that of some modern translators. When the Bodhisatta asks Uddaka (here Rudraka), "Who is your teacher, whose teaching do you profess?", the latter replies, "I do not have any teacher: I have realised (this teaching) correctly by myself and on my own". This account differs widely in style and content from the Pāli, Chinese and Mahāvastu accounts, which are generally similar, and is clearly later.

Two accounts, virtually identical in their translated form, are preserved in Tibetan translation in the Abhiniskramana-sūtra of an unknown school (but, because of the close agreement of this and other passages with the following, presumably Sarvāstivādin or Mūla-sarvāstivādin) (P 967, vol.39, p.16.3.4f.) and in the Vinayavastu of the Mūla-sarvāstivādins (P 1030, vol.42, p.34.4.1f: ch.17, Saṃgha-bheda-vastu). Although older than that of the Lalita-vistara, and closer in style to the other early accounts, the narration of the two meetings in these texts fails to preserve any differences: the two meetings are described identically, the only difference being the names and attainments of the two teachers.

Of the extant texts as a whole, the concluding portions of the Pāli version bring out the difference in status between the two individuals the most clearly. The Mahāvastu version, though briefer than the Pāli, is also quite clear. There the Buddha relates that Ālāra Kālāma suggested that the two of them lead the community of disciples together, and thus set the Bodhisatta on equal footing with himself (samānārthatāye sthāpayet), while Uddaka asked the Bodhi-

satta to take over the community of disciples, and thus established the Bodhisatta in the position of teacher (ācārya-sthāne sthāpaye)⁶. The two Chinese versions are less clear, but still preserve some differences. The Lalita-vistara, in its account of the second meeting, combines elements from both meetings, generally using the vocabulary of the Mahāvastu: Uddaka says, "Come then, let you and I lead this community", thus setting the Bodhisatta on equal footing with himself (samānārthe sthāpayati) and establishing him in the position of teacher (ācārya-sthāne sthāpayati). The Abhiniskramana-sūtra and the Vinayavastu again fail to preserve any difference whatsoever.

Finally, it should be noted that Uddaka Rāmaputta is never addressed or referred to as Rāma, as is given in the English translations of the Pāli and implied by the English translations of the Mahāvastu: in Pāli he is addressed simply as āvuso, in the Mahāvastu as bho Udraka or simply Udraka, in the Lalita-vistara as mārsa; in Pāli he is referred to as Uddaka Rāmaputta, in the Mahāvastu as Udraka Rāmaputra, and in the Lalita-vistara as Rudraka Rāmaputra or simply Rudraka. Elsewhere in Sanskrit texts he is referred to as Udraka, not Rāma (Divyāvadāna, ed. P. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Darbhanga 1959, p. 250; Śikṣasamuccaya, ed. C. Bendall, Indo-Iranian Reprints, The Hague 1957, p. 105.17; etc.). In the Pāli commentaries as well he is referred to simply as Uddaka (Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā, Mahāmakūṭa Rājavidyālaya, Bangkok, Vol. 1, p. 77; Buddhavaṃsa-aṭṭhakathā, Bhūmibālo Bhikkhu Foundation, Bangkok 1979, pp. 12, 34, 529.)⁷

The material given above is sufficient to make it clear that Uddaka Rāmaputta and Rāma were two different persons, and that Rāma, Uddaka's teacher, had died by the time of the Bodhisatta's meeting with Uddaka; it does not, however, tell us whether or not Uddaka was the actual son of Rāma, as implied by his name and one Chinese translation. It is also not clear whether or not Uddaka had himself attained to the plane of neither perception nor non-perception. The texts that treat Uddaka and Rāma as different persons, and give the difference in status between Ālāra and Uddaka, imply that he had not: otherwise, why the difference in status? Thus the sub-commentary on the Pāli version of this passage states that only Rāma had attained to this samāpatti, not Uddaka⁸. The other texts imply that Uddaka, as a teacher in his own right, had attained to the state that he taught; on their side is the fact that in Indian yogic systems attainment is held to be one of the prerequisites of teaching. Later Sanskrit Buddhist traditions certainly held that Uddaka had attained, and give him as an example of one who had reached the summit of existence (bhavāgṛa = the plane of neither perception nor non-perception) and been reborn there, but was bound, because of past karma, to fall once more into the realm of Māra, to the animal- or even the hell-planes. For example, the Saundarananda-kāvya of Aśvaghoṣa states that "even though the sage Udraka attained to the formless summit of exist-

ence, he will depart from there when his karma is exhausted, and fall to the animal-plane"⁹.

As regards the age of the passages studied here, the Pāli and the Mahāvastu accounts are clearly the oldest; the latter, as simpler and less stereotyped, may be the older of the two. The Lalita-vistara, like the Mahāvastu in general, contains material from various strata mixed with verse; thus the bulk of the account of the meeting with Ālāra, given in the first person, is quite early in style, and strongly resembles that of the Mahāvastu, while the account of the meeting with Uddaka, given in the third person and opening with an explanation of how the Bodhisatta studied under Uddaka only as an expedient (upāya), in order to demonstrate that mundane meditations do not lead to release (laukika-samādhinām-anihsaranatā), is clearly much later. The accounts of the Abhiniskramana-sūtra and the Vinayavastu, though preserving a relatively ancient style, underwent alteration at a later date.

NOTES

- 1 In the PTS edition only the account of the Ariya-pariyesana is given in full; the others are virtually abbreviated out of existence. The Thai, Burmese and Nālandā editions give the account in full in each case. M 26 omits the sections on the three similes and the austerities.
- 2 In order to show the difference of tense clearly, the past forms of the verbs in the account of the second meeting are given in parentheses, followed by the present forms that occur in the account of the first meeting, that with Ālāra.
- 3 In the account of the first meeting, Ālāra is addressed in the vocative by his gotta name as āvuso Kālāma: cf. Papañca-sūdanī (Mahāmakūṭa Rājavidyālaya, Bangkok, Vol. 2, p. 229): Ālāroti nāmaṃ... Kālāmoti gottam. Unfortunately, the commentary does not give any such information for Uddaka.
- 4 While Bhikkhu Nānamoli has translated this portion of the narrative correctly, I. B. Horner has simply repeated the passage dealing with Ālāra with the names changed.
- 5 The text of the Mahāvastu is somewhat corrupt. In Basak's edition, p. 168.12, correct bho Udrakena to bho Udraka; at p. 169.1 correct saṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatanam to naiva-saṃjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatanam: the whole phrase should probably read yam-idam naiva... (cf. 168.13). A lacuna occurs in the account of the meeting with Ārāda, p. 166.8-10, and should be corrected on the basis of the account of the meeting with Udraka, p. 168.8-11; cf. also Lalita-vistara 174.19-22.
- 6 This portion of the narrative has been mistranslated by Jones (loc. cit.):

samāna here is a present participle belonging with the preceding tathā-darsanam ca (cf. 167.6 where samāna occurs twice: evam-darsanam ca samānam (= pres.part.) samāna (= equal) arthatāye sthāpayet, and 173.9 sa khalvahaṃ bhikkṣavaḥ tathā-darsana-samāno....)

7 The Thai script versions of the passage dealing with Uddaka are corrupt, and do in fact give the vocative Rāma in place of the nominative Rāmo; furthermore, the aorist pavedesi occurs as the present pavedeti. Other verbs, however, remain in the aorist: vihāsi, ahosi, aññāsi. According to the notes on variant readings in the Burmese script Chattha-saṅgīti-piṭaka, the vocative also occurs in the Sinhalese and Khmer script versions, as well as in some Burmese versions (Mūla-pannāsa-pāli, p.221, n.4; Majjhima-pannāsa-pāli, p.281, n.4, and Nānā-pāthā, p.451). The note given at the first occurrence of the variant, that is M 26, is by far the lengthiest note in the entire Burmese script Majjhima, which demonstrates that the confusion of the identity of Uddaka and Rāma is one of the major textual problems of that collection. The full text of this valuable and interesting note is as follows: "Āvuso Rāma: Sīhalapothhake, Syāma-pothhake, katthaci Maramma-pothhake dissamāna-pātho. Mahāsatto Rāmaputtam-eva avoca, na Rāman. Rāmo hi tattha gaṇācariyo bhavēyya, tadā ca kālaṅkato asanto. Tenevettha Rāmāyattāni kriya-padāni atīta-kālavasena āgatāni. Udaḥ ca Rāmaputto mahāsattassa sa-brahmacārī-tv-eva vutto na ācariyo-ti. Tikāyam ca 'Pāliyam Rāmasseva samāpatti-lābhita āgatā na Udaḥkassā-ti' ādi pacchābhāge pakāsitā." (Mūla-pannāsa-pāli, p.221, n.4). Unfortunately I did not obtain the Burmese script edition until after the article was completed, so could not refer to this note in the body of the text. Another point worthy of note is that the Burmese and Thai editions prefer the spelling Udaḥ, which is one of the variant spellings of the Mahāvastu.

8 Mūla-pannāsa-tīkā, part 2, Burmese script ed., Rangoon 1951, p.139.

9 The Saundarananda of Aśvaghoṣa, ed. and tr. by E.H.Johnston, repr.Delhi 1975, p.155 (note at text verse 56) and translation p.65, note at verse 56. Although Johnston excludes verses 56 and 57 from the body of the text as "undoubtedly spurious", I see no cogent reason for doing so. The two verses fit the context admirably, and bhavāgra is not, as Johnston would have it, particularly "a late word": it occurs at least once in the Pali Canon in the same meaning as in the later non-canonical Sanskrit texts: atthāvuso neva-saññā-nāsaññāyat-anūpaṇā devā: idaṃ bhavānam aggaṃ (A III p.202). Cf. also Suvikrānta-vikrānti-pariprocchā, in Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 17, ed.P.Vaidya, Darbhanga 1961, p.60.

THE THREE SIMILES

Peter Skilling

After leaving Uddaka Rāmaputta, the Bodhisatta went to Uruvelā, where, on the banks of the Nerañjarā river; three similes (upama) occurred to him. These similes are given in three of the afore-mentioned discourses of the Middle Collection: the Greater Discourse to Saccaka, the Discourse to Prince Bodhi and the Discourse to Saṅgārava (M 36, 85, 100)¹. Here an error in the romanised Pāli text (M I p.241), though noted by the editor himself (ib., p.550), has led to errors of translation. The initial reason for assuming that there is an error is one of context: three different similes are given, but the applications of the first two similes are exactly the same, with only the last being different. The error in fact occurs in the application of the second simile, which fits neither the simile itself nor the progression of thought. Another problem involves variant readings in different versions of the Pāli text; here it is less simple to speak of "error", a point which will be discussed below. To start with, a translation of the corrected Pāli text, in which some of the variant readings have been adopted, will be given, with the correction and the variants underlined.

"Three similes, Aggivessana, never heard before at any point in the past, came to me spontaneously:

(i) Suppose there is a piece of wet, sappy² wood lying in the water, and someone happens along with a fire-stick, thinking, 'I will make a fire and produce heat'. Do you think that he will be able to do so, by rubbing the fire-stick against this piece of wet, sappy wood, lying in the water?"

"Certainly not, good Gotama, for that piece of wood is wet and sappy, and, more than that, is lying in the water: the person in question would only end up wearying and frustrating himself."

"Such is the case, Aggivessana, with samanas and brāhmanas who dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn³ from sense-pleasures, and whose tendency towards sense-pleasures, desire for sense-pleasures, infatuation with sense-pleasures, thirst for sense-pleasures, and burning for sense-pleasures is neither inwardly well-abandoned nor well-subdued: even if, as a result of their striving⁴, these respected samanas and brāhmanas undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, they will be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment, and even if they do not undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, resulting from their striving, they will still be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment. This, Aggivessana, is the first simile, never heard before at any point in the past, that came to me spontaneously."

(ii) "Then, Aggivessana, another, a second, simile, never heard before at any point in the past, came to me spontaneously. Suppose there is a piece of wet, sappy wood, lying well away from the water on dry land, and someone happens along with a fire-stick, thinking, 'I will make a fire and produce heat'. Do you think that he will be able to do so, by rubbing the fire-stick against this piece of wet, sappy wood, lying well away from the water on dry land?"

"Certainly not, good Gotama: even though it is lying well away from the water on dry land, that piece of wood is wet and sappy: the person in question would only end up wearying and frustrating himself."

"Such is the case, Aggivessana, with samanas and brāhmanas who dwell only physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures, but whose tendency towards sense-pleasures...(as above)...is neither inwardly well-abandoned nor well-subdued: even if, as a result of their striving, these respected samanas and brāhmanas undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, they will be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment, and even if they do not undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, resulting from their striving, they will still be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment. This, Aggivessana, is the second simile, never heard before at any point in the past, that came to me spontaneously."

(iii) "Then, Aggivessana, another, a third, simile, never heard before at any point in the past, came to me spontaneously. Suppose there is a piece of dry, sapless⁵ wood, lying well away from the water on dry land, and someone happens along with a fire-stick, thinking, 'I will make a fire and produce heat'. Do you think he will be able to do so, by rubbing the fire-stick against this piece of dry, sapless wood lying well away from the water on dry land?"

"Indeed he would, good Gotama, for that piece of wood is dry and sapless, and, more than that, is lying well away from the water on dry land."

"Such is the case, Aggivessana, with samanas and brāhmanas who dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures, and whose tendency towards sense-pleasures, desire for sense-pleasures, infatuation with sense-pleasures, thirst for sense-pleasures and burning for sense-pleasures is both inwardly well-abandoned and well-subdued: even if, as a result of their striving, these respected samanas and brāhmanas undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, they will be capable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment, and even if they do not undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, resulting from their striving, they will still be capable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment. This, Aggivessana, is the third simile, never heard before at any point in the past, that came to me spontaneously."

In the application of the second simile, the PTS edition reads, as in the application of the first simile, kāyena c'eva kāmehi avūpakatthā viharanti, "and do not dwell physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures"; however, as noted by Brenckner himself and as given in the Thai edition, the reading should be kāyena c'eva kāmehi vūpakatthā viharanti, "and dwell physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures". This is demanded by the context: here the piece of wood, the mind, though still wet, saturated with sensual desire, is on dry land, that is, withdrawn physically from sense-pleasures. This error in the PTS edition has given rise to faulty translations in I.B.Horner's Middle Length Sayings I (op. cit., p.296) and in A.Bareau's Recherches... I (op.cit., p.42-3).

The second problem, that of variant readings, is more complex. The Thai script edition and the corrected PTS edition give the part of the applications of the three similes under discussion as follows:

- (i) do not dwell physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures (kāyena c'eva kāmehi avūpakatthā viharanti)
- (ii) dwell physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures (kāyena c'eva kāmehi vūpakatthā viharanti)
- (iii) = (ii)

This suits the context and could stand as it is; however, the Burmese and Nālandā editions, introducing a further element, read as follows:

- (i) dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures (kāyena c'eva cittaṇa ca kāmehi avūpakatthā viharanti)
- (ii) dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures (kāyena c'eva cittaṇa ca kāmehi vūpakatthā viharanti)
- (iii) = (ii)

Here again, only the first and the last statements fit the context: "not being mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures", in the first simile, summarises "their tendency towards sense-pleasures ... is neither inwardly well-abandoned nor well-subdued"; "being mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures", in the third simile, summarises "their tendency towards sense-pleasures ... is both inwardly well-abandoned and well-subdued". But in the second application, "being mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures" contradicts "their tendency towards sense-pleasures is neither well-abandoned nor well-subdued, and further contradicts the simile itself, for the piece of wood, the mind, is still wet, that is saturated by sense desires.

Equivalent Sanskrit-Tibetan texts (according to A.Bareau, op.cit., p. 43; the Chinese texts studied by him do not give the passage on the three similes) give the following readings:

A. Lalita-vistara (op.cit., p.181-2, Sanskrit; the Tibetan translation gives the same readings)

- (i) dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures
(kāmebhyo'navakṛsta-kāyā viharanti sma kāmebhyo anavakṛstā-cittāśca viharanti sma)
- (ii) dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures
(kāmebhyo vyapakṛsta-kāya-cittā viharanti)
- (iii) = (ii)

B. Mahāvastu 2 (op.cit., pp.169-173, Sanskrit only)

- (i) dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures
(kāmehi avyapakṛsta-kāyā viharanti avyapakṛsta-cittā)
- (ii) dwell physically withdrawn but not mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures
(kāmehi vyapakṛsta-kāyā viharanti avyapakṛsta-cittā)
- (iii) dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures
(kāmehi vyapakṛsta-kāyā viharanti vyapakṛsta-cittā)

C. Abhiniskramana-sūtra (op.cit., p.18.5.2f, Tibetan) and Vinayavastu (op.cit., ch.17, p.37.1.2, Tibetan)

- (i) dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn (thag sring ba-vyapak-rsta?) from sense-pleasures
- (ii) dwell having abandoned (spong ba-prahīna?) sense-pleasures physically but not mentally
- (iii) dwell both mentally and physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures.

Firstly, it may be noted that all Sanskrit-Tibetan versions give both body and mind, as do the Burmese and Nālandā editions; the Lalita-vistara agrees entirely with the latter two texts - with the same vocabulary but different phrasing - and thus does not solve the problem of the application of the second simile. The Mahāvastu, the Abhiniskramana-sūtra and the Vinayavastu versions, however, fit both the context and the progression of thought: in the second simile, "physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures" is equivalent to "on dry land", out of the "water" of sense-pleasures; "mentally not withdrawn from sense-pleasures" corresponds to the piece of wet wood, the mind still saturated by sensual desires.

The main problem now becomes whether or not the Pāli text should include the phrase "(not) mentally withdrawn" in addition to "(not) physically withdrawn", and if so, how to resolve the application of the second simile. It may be argued that the addition of "mentally withdrawn" is redundant, since it is difficult to take it as anything other than an equivalent of the list of near-synonyms beginning with "tendency towards sense-pleasures". However, redundancies abound in both Pāli and Sanskrit texts; it is given in the majority of

texts studied and may be further supported by other canonical texts, which, both in Pāli (D III 285 = A IV 152; S V 67) and Sanskrit (Daśottara-sūtra, ed. K.Mittal, in *Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im Älteren Buddhismus*, Berlin 1957, p. 84), mention physical and mental withdrawal (kāya-, citta- vūpakāsa- - vyapak-arsa) together. Non-canonical texts of the Sanskrit traditions also deal with these two, but give them broader definitions (cf. Abhidharma-kośa, Bhāṣya and Vyākhyā, 6:6a; Artha-viniścaya-sūtra-nibandhana, ed. N.Samtani, Patna 1971, p. 202; Śrāvaka-bhūmi of Asaṅga, ed. K.Shukla, Patna 1973, p.362). Further, one of the Pāli discourses that contains this passage, the Greater Discourse to Saccaka, opens with the question of "physical and mental development" (kāya-, citta- -bhāvanā). Thus it seems likely that both physical and mental withdrawal should be included in the Pāli text.

It is, however, difficult to include both in the application of the second simile as it stands. Adhering as closely as possible to the extant manuscript tradition, the only possible reading would be kāyena v'eva na cittena kāmehi vūpakatthā viharanti, which sounds unidiomatic. The only acceptable solution for the time being is to omit the reference to mental withdrawal in the application of the second simile, a solution which is not entirely satisfactory, but at least can be supported by available manuscripts. Thus we get, as translated above,

- (i) kāyena c'eva cittena ca kāmehi avūpakatthā viharanti
- (ii) kāyena c'eva kāmehi vūpakatthā viharanti (see PTS ed. p.550 and Bhikkhu Nānamoli, op.cit., Vol.3, p.195, notes, for other suggested readings; Nānamoli suggests the same readings as here for (i) and (iii))
- (iii) kāyena c'eva cittena ca kāmehi vūpakatthā viharanti.

Numerous other differences occur in the various versions of this passage. While the Pāli texts situate this incident at Uruvelā, Senānigama, on the banks of the Nerañjarā river, after the Bodhisatta has left Uddaka Rāmaputta and before his practice of self-mortification, the Abhiniskramana-sūtra and the Vinayavastu situate it "south of the Caṅgā" (Abh'niskramana, doubtless an error for the following) or "south of Gayā" (Vinayavastu), at Uruvilvā-Kāśyapa's (Kāśyapa, given by both texts, probably an error) Senā-nigama, by the Nairāñjanā river, after the practice of austerities (Abhiniskramana) or after the practice of the bulk of the austerities (Vinayavastu). The Mahāvastu and the Lalita-vistara situate the event on Gayāśīra mountain, after the Bodhisatta has left Uddaka Rāmaputta; after the three similes have occurred to him he then proceeds to Uruvilvā Senāpatigṛāma(ka) and the Nairāñjanā river, and begins his practice of austerities.

The latter two texts, which agree with the Pāli in situating the three

similes before the austerities, give a passage, not found in Pāli, after the similes but before the austerities, which connects the two: "Then, O monks, I thought, 'I dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures, and have thoughts about sense-pleasures, desire for sense-pleasures, burning for sense-pleasures and attachment to sense-pleasures well under control (*prati-vinīta*); even if I should undergo unpleasant feelings - acute, harsh and rack-ing, that torment the self and torture the body - I will yet be capable of knowledge, insight and understanding of that which transcends the human state'" (Mahāvastu 2, *op.cit.*, p.173; Lalita-vistara gives a similar passage, worded differently).

Another difference is in the string of synonyms for sensual desire, beginning in Pāli with "tendency towards sense-pleasures", and in the participles denoting their (non-) relinquishment; these differ from text to text, but need not detain us here as the differences do not affect the meaning. The similes themselves are also worded differently in the various texts; the only significant difference here being that in the Abhiniskramana and Vinayavastu the first two similes are exactly the same - "a piece of wet, soggy wood, taken from the water and placed on dry land" - which raises the reverse of the main problem dealt with above: the same simile with two different applications. Another difference which does not affect the meaning concerns the order of the material: while the Pāli, the Abhiniskramana and Vinayavastu give the similes first, followed by their applications, the Mahāvastu and Lalita-vistara give the "applications" first, followed by the similes, then by a repetition of the applications (the Mahāvastu gives the text in full throughout, with one omission in the first simile, probably a lacuna or misprint, while the Lalita-vistara abbreviates the second and third similes considerably). Further, in the Pāli and the Mahāvastu, no doubt the most ancient versions, the narrative is in the first person; in the other texts it is related of the Bodhisatta in the third person.

All the texts studied here give a follow-up passage, after the practice of self-mortification, that refers back to the applications of the three similes. The Pāli version (M I, p.246.20) reads as follows, "Then, Aggivessana, I thought, 'This is the limit (*etāva-paramam*) of unpleasant feeling - acute and harsh, resulting from striving - undergone by any *samanas* or *brāhmanas* in the past, the future, or the present: there is nothing beyond this'" (summarised translation). The Mahāvastu (p.182.3) reads "Then, monks, I thought, 'This is the limit of unpleasant feeling - acute, severe and harsh, that torments the self and tortures the body - undergone by any respected *śrāmanas* or *brāhmanas* in the past or at present: no one is capable of surpassing this'".⁶

The one major difference that occurs in the applications of the similes

is that all Sanskrit-Tibetan versions mention only that, even should the *śrāmanas* and *brāhmanas* be tormented by pain as a result of their self-mortification, they will or will not be capable of enlightenment, while the Pāli version alone introduces a second alternative: whether or not they are tormented by pain as a result of their self-mortification, they will or will not be capable of enlightenment. Although the Pāli version cannot be rejected offhand, it seems unnecessary to include this second alternative. The general application of the similes, here as well as in other contexts (cf. M 119, III p.95; M 126, III pp.141-144; Petakopadesa, p.1-2) is impossibility/ possibility: in this context only when the mind, the piece of wood, is both physically and mentally withdrawn or removed from sense-pleasures can it give birth to the "spark of enlightenment"; thus the practice of self-mortification can only be effective when the practitioner is so withdrawn. It would seem that, had the Bodhisatta further realised that enlightenment could be realised without the practice of self-mortification - the second alternative to the third simile in the Pāli - he would not have embarked upon such practice, for no less than six years, according to common tradition. That at that point the Bodhisatta believed the practice of austerities to be necessary, is clearly given in one of the Pāli discourses that contains the passage in question, the Discourse to Prince Bodhi (M 85, II p.93), where the Buddha introduces the narration of the quest for enlightenment and the practice of self-mortification with the statement, "before my enlightenment, when I was an unenlightened bodhisatta, I thought that 'happiness is not to be attained by means of happiness: happiness is to be attained through suffering'". The relation of the austerities itself confirms this: it is only when the Bodhisatta realises that he has reached the limit of suffering to be attained through self-mortification that he sees that this practice has not led him to enlightenment. Wondering if there is another path to enlightenment, he reflects upon a past experience of meditation (*jhāna*, *dhyaṇa*), and realises that this is the path. He then reflects, "Why should I fear a happiness that is free of sense-pleasure and free of unhealthy states of mind?", and goes on to reject self-mortification, adopt a healthy diet, practise meditation and attain enlightenment. (M I 246-7; the Sanskrit-Tibetan texts studied here all contain this passage, with the usual differences of phrasing.) Thus the second alternative given in the Pāli seems unlikely, and may well be a later interpolation; it brings to mind the interpolations in the Lalita-vistara, where it is said that the Bodhisatta already knew the futility of self-mortification but practised it to the limit in order to demonstrate this futility (*op.cit.*, p.182-3, etc.).

In this case the Mahāvastu seems to give the most ancient and the clearest version of this event; the other versions all present difficulties and appear to have become corrupted with the passage of time.

NOTES

- 1 As in the case of the discourses dealing with the meetings with Ālāra and Uddaka, only the first discourse of the PTS edition (M 36) gives the text in full; the Thai, Burmese and Nālandā editions all give the full text in each case.
- 2 After the commentary, Papañca-sūdanī (Vol.2, Mahāmakūṭa Rājavidyālaya, Bangkok, B.E.2463, p.307): sa-snehan-ti sa-khīraṃ.
- 3 Papañca-sūdanī, loc.cit.: avūpakatthā-ti anaparatā; cf. Kośa 6:6a vyapakarṣa = dūrikarana.
- 4 Papañca-sūdanī, loc.cit.: opakkamikā-ti upakkama-nibbatthā.
- 5 Papañca-sūdanī, p.308: kolāpan-ti chinna-sineham nivāpaṃ.
- 6 The Mahāvastu is here very corrupt; see Edgerton's suggested corrections, which are followed here (Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, repr. Delhi 1972, p.155b, ettāvat). Whatever the original may have been, the general idea is confirmed by the Pāli, Lalita-vistara (p.102.25), Abhiniskramana (19.1.7) and Vinayavastu (37.5.2), and Jones' rendering (op.cit., p.125) is certainly wrong. I.B.Horner's translation from the Pāli (op.cit., p.301), though perhaps not literally wrong, is unhappy and fails to bring out the meaning clearly; Bhikkhu Nanamoli's rendering (op.cit., Vol.1, p.230, Vol.3, p.191) is much preferable.

ABBREVIATIONS AND TEXTS USED

Pāli: the PTS (Pali Text Society, London), the Burmese script Chattha-saṅgīti (Rangoon), the Thai script (Mahāmakūṭa Rājavidyālaya, Bangkok) and the Nālandā (Nālandā, Bihar) editions have been consulted for the passages dealt with here; of these the Burmese gives the best readings, which are mainly followed by the Nālandā edition, which adds modern punctuation. References to other Pāli texts, except when otherwise noted, are to PTS editions, with standard abbreviations.

Tibetan: the Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka (P), Suzuki Research Foundation reprint, Tokyo-Kyoto, has been used; references are to catalogue number, followed by volume number, page, folio and line.

Names: for the sake of consistency, the Pāli forms (bodhisatta, Uddaka, etc.) have been used, except in direct citations from the Sanskrit.

NEWS & NOTES

Conference on Hīnayānist Sanskrit Literature

The third conference sponsored by the Kommission für buddhistische Studien der Akademie der Wissenschaften was held in Göttingen between 13th-16th July 1982. The occasion was also made to coincide with the 85th birthday of Emeritus Prof. Ernst Waldschmidt, the doyen of researchers in Central Asian literature.

An indication of the scope of the proceedings is provided by the titles of those papers (all of which will be published in 1983) which are likely to prove of most interest to our readers: S.Dietz "Zur Frage der Schulzugehörigkeit der Fragmente des Abhidharmaskandhapādaśāstra und der Lokaprajñapti", E.Mayeda "Schools of the Chinese Four Āgamas. Studies in Japan", Bhikkhu Pāsādika "Bericht über die Sammlung von Kanon-Zitaten aus dem Abhidharmakośa", M.Schmidt "Stand der Arbeiten am Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der Turfan-Funde", L.Schmitt "Verschiedene Versionen einzelner kanonischer Lehrreden und das Problem ihrer Schulzugehörigkeit", D.Seyfort Rugg "Über die Nikāyas der Śrāvakas und den Ursprung der philosophischen Schulen des Buddhismus" and Ch.Tripaṭhi "Saṅgītisūtra, Nipāta II und Ekottarāgama-Parallelen hierzu".

IABS

The fifth conference of The International Association of Buddhist Studies was held at Hertford College, Oxford, between 16th-21st August 1982, under the presidency of Ven.Dr Walpola Rāhula. It had been organised by the local Secretary (and Hon.Secretary of the Pali Text Society), Prof.Richard Gombrich.

All aspects of Buddhology were covered, including special sessions on Buddhist Logic and Epistemology, Art and Iconography, Anthropology of Buddhism, Tibetan Religious and Philosophical Thought, and Contemporary Japanese Buddhism. Reports were received on the Critical Pāli Dictionary, Pāli Tipitakam Concordance, Pāli-English Dictionary (proposed revised edition) and the Journal of the PTS (proposed revival) (by the Editor-in-Chief of the CPD and President of the PTS, K.R.Norman), Hōbōgirin (French-language encyclopaedia of Buddhism based in Kyoto - Hubert Durt), "Sanskrit Dictionary of Buddhist Texts from the Turfan Finds" (Siglinde Dietz), Systematic Survey of Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (Akira Yuyama - who presented the same report in German in Göttingen), and "Group for Buddhist and Jain Philological Studies" in France (Gérard Fussman).

The papers included Thich Thiên Châu "The Literature of Puṅgalavāda", S.Collins "Friendship as a Buddhist Virtue", L.S.Cousins "Samatha-yāna and Vipassanā-yāna", S.Dietz "Some Problems concerning two Abhidharma Fragments from Gilgit", Mirko Fryba "Applications of Dhamma in Western Therapy", B.G.Gokhale

"Early Buddhism and the Urban Revolution", Paul Griffiths "Nirodhasamapatti: History of a Buddhist Problem", Jacques Maquet "An Aesthetic Anthropological Approach to Buddhism in Sri Lanka", Hisashi Matsumura "Textual Studies of the Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts", Bhikkhu Pāsādikā "Prolegomena on an English Translation of the Sūtrasamuccaya", Joseph F. Roccasalvo "The Anattā Doctrine and Thai Buddhist Interpretations", A. Syrkin "Notes on Buddha's Threats in Dīghanikāya", R. C. Tewari "Socio-Cultural Aspects of Theravāda Buddhism in Nepal" and Martin G. Wiltshire "The Arhat and the Suicide Dilemma: A Problem in Early Buddhism".

Catalogues of Buddhist MSS

Assessing the literary holdings of archives and libraries is a necessary prerequisite to revealing their contents by means of text editions and translations. Thus, the first issue in the series, "Catalogue of Oriental manuscripts, xylographs, etc. in Danish collections" is a welcome addition to this literature. The late C. E. Godakumbura (see PBR II 63) has produced a Catalogue of Ceylonese Manuscripts (1980) which not only updates previous descriptive lists of Pali, Sanskrit and Sinhala texts in the possession of the publishers, the Royal Danish Library, Copenhagen, but incorporates the manuscripts in private hands. (For details of the Rask Collection, the nucleus of the Library's collection of Pali texts, and the work of editors and lexicographers in Denmark, see Russell Webb "Pali Buddhist Studies in Denmark", PBR II 162.) The above volume complements similar works from the same source, viz. G. Coedes Catalogue des manuscrits en pâli, laotien et siamois provenant de la Thaïlande (1966) - much of which was translated for H. Saddhātissa's paper, "Pali Literature from Laos" (Studies in Pali and Buddhism, ed. A. K. Narain, Delhi 1979) - and W. Heissig and C. Bawden Catalogue of Mongol Books, Manuscripts and Xylographs (1971).

In London, as far back as 1876 E. Haas compiled a Catalogue of Sanskrit and Pali Books in the British Museum. Cecil Bendall later prepared a Catalogue of Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit Books in the British Museum (1893), followed by L. D. Barnett's 2nd and 3rd Supplements (1908 and 1928) which are still available. JPBS II (1883, repr. 1978) featured a "List of Pali MSS in the British Museum" (and similar lists for Cambridge, Copenhagen and Stockholm) by K. J. R. Hoerning who supplemented it in Vol. VII (1888). Unpublished supplements were subsequently drafted by him (1903) and Barnett (1930). Related to these materials is the Nevill Collection of Sinhalese Manuscripts from which the long-awaited Catalogue of Pali-Sinhalese Buddhist Texts, compiled by K. D. Somadasa, is expected to be published in autumn 1983. However, several lists have already appeared, viz. M. de Z. Wickremasinghe Catalogue of the Sinhalese manuscripts in the British Museum (1900), Somadasa Laṅkāve puskola pot-nāmaṇaliya (3 vols, Colombo 1959-64),

J. Hettiaracchi List of Sinhalese and Pali manuscripts in the British Library (1974 - typescript translation of Somadasa Vol. 3), Barnett List of Pali, Sinhalese, Sanskrit and other manuscripts, formerly in the possession of Hugh Nevill, Esq. (MS 1909) and "Handlist of Sinhalese manuscripts" (MS 1908) and M. de Z. Wickremasinghe Catalogue of the Sinhalese printed books in the Library of the British Museum (1901).

For the materials in the other languages of Buddhist South-East Asia see Pe Maung Tin "Burma manuscripts in the British Museum" (Journal of the Burma Research Society 14, Rangoon 1924), L. D. Barnett List of Pali manuscripts, excluding the Nevill collection (typescript, 1930) and Catalogue of the Burmese books in the British Museum (1913), P. H. Herbert "The Sir Arthur Phayre collection of Burmese manuscripts" (British Library Journal I, 1975), G. E. Marrison Handlist of the Tai and Mon-Khmer manuscripts in the British Museum, ... (typescript, 1968) and, in preparation by Herbert, Marrison and H. Ginsburg, "Catalogue of mainland South East Asia manuscripts in the British Library".

At the India Office Library, D. J. Wijayaratne and A. S. Kulasuriya have compiled a Catalogue of the Sinhalese Manuscripts (ed. C. H. B. Reynolds, 1981) which complements H. Oldenberg "Catalogue of Pali Manuscripts" (JPBS I, 1882, repr. 1978), V. Fausbøll Catalogue of the Mandalay Manuscripts (off-printed from JPBS XI, 1894-96, repr. 1978), Kenneth Whitbread Catalogue of Burmese Printed Books (1969), L. de La Vallée Poussin Catalogue of the Tibetan Manuscripts from Tun-huang (1962) and P. Denwood Catalogue of Tibetan Manuscripts and Blockprints outside the Stein Collection (1975).

The Buddha's Path to Deliverance

The 4th edition of this classic anthology of Pali texts in translation has just been published by the Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy. The compiler was the late German mahāthera, Nyānatiloka, who is remembered also for his other, world-acclaimed anthology (based on the Four Noble Truths), The Word of the Buddha.

The present work, "described as a compendium of the entire teaching of the Buddha", is divided into the three sections of the Noble Eightfold Path - Morality (sīla), Concentration (saṃādhi) and Wisdom (pañña). Suttas (or extracts therefrom) are arranged in this order to present an authoritative and indispensable guide to the practice of Buddhism.

Rune E.A. Johansson

Only as a result of unrelated correspondence has the Editor learned of the death of Dr Johansson at his home in Spånga, Sweden, sometime during the summer of 1981. (His widow declined to reply to the Editor's request for further details but it is known that her husband was obliged to retire from Lund University for health reasons some years ago.)

Born 1918, he studied Psychology, Sanskrit and Pali at Lund and obtained his licentiate in 1954. He continued his studies in Sanskrit at the University of Calcutta and in Pali at the University of Ceylon where he prepared a long paper on "Citta, Mano, Viññāna - a Psychosemantic Investigation" (University of Ceylon Review XXIII, 1965). His English study, The Psychology of Nirvāṇa (London 1969), was the first attempt to fit all the different explanations of Nirvāṇa contained in the Pali Canon into a consistent picture, relating the whole to Western psychology. A sequel to this work, based upon the formula of paticca-samuppāda, was published in 1978 by the Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies in Copenhagen under the title, The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism. The first Pali grammar in Swedish was composed by him. Entitled, Buddhistiska Texter Pali, it appeared in the Arsbok 1967-68 which was published in 1969 by the "Seminar for Slavic Languages" at Lund University. An expanded version in English - Pali Buddhist Texts explained to the beginner - was subsequently published by the Scandinavian Institute (Copenhagen 1973). Apart from this primer and a short essay on "Psychological Causality in Early Buddhism" (PER III 22), Johansson's most notable achievements were the translations of the Dhammapada (the first directly from the Pali - Stockholm 1967) and the Sutta-Nipāta (Buddhistiska ballader och lärodipter, Stockholm 1976). For some inexplicable reason the publisher omitted six suttas (Parābhava, Vasala, Vaṅṅisa, Brāhmaṇadhammika, Māgha and Kokāliya) from the latter collection and these subsequently appeared in Buddhistisk Gemenskap, the journal of an association with the same name, during 1978-9.

The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism (scheduled for reprint in 1983), Pali Buddhist Texts (revised and enlarged ed. 1981) and the Sutta-Nipāta translation were reviewed for this journal (IV 92; I 123 and II 168; and II 67 respectively). The author provided much of the background material to the Editor's survey on "Pali Buddhist Studies in Sweden" (PER IV 26).

His is undoubtedly a serious loss to Pali Buddhist research in Scandinavia. May he be at peace.

A Treasury of the Buddha's Words: Discourses from the Middle Collection.

Translated by Nāṇamoli Thera, edited and arranged by Phra Khantipālo.

3 vols, Mahāmakut, Bangkok, but available only from Wat Buddha-Dhamma, Ten Mile Hollow, Wisemans Ferry, NSW 2255, Australia.

The late Ven. Nāṇamoli, in his short career, produced an extraordinary number of translations from the Pali in addition to his masterly version of the Visuddhimagga. Among other things he left a manuscript rendering of the Majjhima Nikāya, a substantial part of which (90 out of the 152 suttas) is here made available. Since it is well-known that the PFS translations of the Canon (even to some extent the Horner Middle Length Sayings) are in need of revision, this is to be welcomed. Nāṇamoli was a skilled and dedicated worker in this field, who constantly strove after elucidation of the texts and experimented with different renderings in his search for the got juste. While not all his ideas may have been right, they are usually worthy of serious consideration. Another well-known English bhikkhu, Ven. Khantipālo, has made the selection, organising the chosen suttas according to a scheme of his own without regard to their canonical order. Thus the contents of Vol. I, entitled Buddhists, embrace (a) "Lay People" and (b) "Bhikkhu Life"; Vol. II, Doing or Talking?, comprises (a) "Mind, Meditation and Training" and (b) "Dialogue and Views", while Vol. III consists of Part III, Path and Fruit: (a) "Understanding (Wisdom, Insight)" and (b) "Attainment", and Part IV, The Buddha: (a) "Striving and Enlightenment" and (b) "The Tathāgata". The scheme is carefully thought out, and the selection and arrangement provide a coherent and progressive course of study which may recommend itself to the lay reader. There is a 25-page introduction to the whole, and there are individual introductions to the suttas, all but two of them by the editor. On the whole it may be said that an excellent job has been done by both translator and editor, so that one's reservations remain limited to a few points.

The problem of style in translating from Pali is a difficult one even when the meaning of the words is not in dispute. I pick, almost at random, a small passage from Sutta 89 to illustrate how Miss Horner and Nāṇamoli respectively tackled the task:

(Horner) Then King Pasenadi addressed Dīgha Kārāyana, saying: "Good Kārāyana, harness some lovely vehicles; we are going to the garden of the pleasure to see its beauties". "Yes, sire", and Dīgha Kārāyana, having answered King Pasenadi in assent, having had many lovely vehicles harnessed, announced to King Pasenadi: "Many lovely vehicles are harnessed for you, sire. You may deem it is now the right time for that."

(Nāṇamoli) Then he [King Pasenadi] told Dīgha Kārāyana: "My friend, have the state carriages got ready. Let us go to the Pleasure Garden to see a

pleasing spot." "Yes, sire", he replied. When the state carriages were ready, he informed the king: "Sire, the state carriages are ready for you. Now it is time to do as you think fit."

Readers may judge for themselves which version they prefer. It is obvious that the prolixity of the original must be cut in any translation: even Miss Horner has done this a little (though one might not think so); and Nānamoli's version too could be still further cut without loss. At this point I must declare an interest, in both senses of the word. Being engaged on a new translation of the Dīgha Nikāya, I am naturally directly concerned with the problem and have already learnt much from a close study of Nānamoli's way of tackling it. The quoted passage contains nothing remotely "controversial", as some passages inevitably do. Sometimes Nānamoli allowed his enthusiasm for "experimental" renderings to run away with him, and the introduction lists a number of cases where more conventional translations have been substituted for terms introduced by him. His use of "divines" for "Brahmins", which seems to me to be a not altogether happy conceit, has however been retained. Arguably, though, his "thinking and pondering" for vitakka-vicāra is preferable to the substituted "initial and sustained application". However, I will not go further into such matters here. In sum, it seems to me that in the difficult search for a suitable style of translation, Nānamoli made significant advances without, perhaps, always attaining the ideal version.

Ven.Khantipālo's introduction is excellent and covers a lot of ground. Here, I will merely draw attention to his remarks (p.xvii) on the classification of suttas according as the doctrine is stated in terms of dhammas or in terms of persons. His comments on the purely intellectual understanding some people have of the suttas (or of Abhidhamma), and of its limitations, are judicious. He also expresses his opinions, forthrightly but fairly, on one or two other matters. And in general, his introductions to the individual suttas are equally valuable. However, I confess I found his remarks on the Gopaka Moggallāna Sutta (No.108: Vol.I, p.223) a trifle disturbing, the more especially as coming from the author of an excellent book on tolerance! His statement that "in Mahāyāna the Buddha becomes an eternal God" is, as regards most Mahāyāna schools at least, incorrect, while his remark on the same page that "'patriarchates' wherever found in Buddhism are bogus" is needlessly tactless.

Finally, I would offer one suggested solution to a small problem and a few technical criticisms. The note on p.96 of Vol.II mentions an "untraceable word in the original Ms: 'meteorative'? or 'metiorative', 'metioratic'??". I suggest that the word is probably 'meliorative', which makes fair sense. The book is well printed and produced and attractive in form, but something seems

to have gone wrong with the chapter-headings of the suttas which should have been checked. I will merely instance the Dhammāyāda Sutta (Vol.I, p.246), which is given the meaningless name of Dhammayada Sutta. There is also a discrepancy between the title on the cover, A Treasury of the Buddha's Words..., and that on the title-page, A Treasury of the Buddha's Discourses..., which will be the despair of all cataloguers. Also, the only clue as to the book's date is that given at the end of the introduction: 1977. If it really was published as long ago as all that, it must have been an unconscionable time in coming to the notice of the outside world - which is a great pity!

Maurice Walshe

New translations of the Dhammapada:

- Phra Khantipālo (tr.) The Path of Truth. Mahāmakut Rājavidyalaya Press, Bangkok 1977. xii + 237pp.
- Harischandra Kaviratna (ed. and tr.) Wisdom of the Buddha. Theosophical University Press, Pasadena 1980. xxxiv + 177pp. Cloth \$8.50, paper \$5.00.
- Sathienpong Wannapok (ed. and tr.) The Buddha's Words. Distributed by Suksit Siam, Bangkok 1979. xxix + 424pp. \$3.00.

With already over thirty English translations of this ever popular anthology, it seems surprising that yet more budding Pali scholars should attempt further renditions, especially in view of the fact that quite a number of Pali texts remain either untranslated or in urgent need of retranslation.

However, the translators of the first two versions under review justify producing "new" recensions even if, after a succession of textual permutations spanning a century, the arguments employed no longer sound convincing. (Since the third version is wholly in Thai with the exception of the actual stanzas I cannot ascertain the translator's reasons for producing it, other than incorporating the Pali text in Thai script and a Thai translation.) Thus, Ven.Khantipālo states: "English translations of the Dhammapada,...,are mostly in prose. This means that although they may be accurate, beauty and ease of memorizing have been sacrificed. The few attempts at a metrical rendering... have resulted in another extreme - the loss of accuracy through attention given to poetic frills and even to rhyme. Pali verses do not employ rhyme and distortion of meaning is inevitable if a translator tries to press the Buddha's words into it. // An English translation must, of course, lose some of the subtle meanings, particularly in the case of words derived from a single root in Pali, where there are no similar forms in English. The present translation is the result of quite a long effort to present the Buddha's words in a way that is both memorable and accurate - as far as this can be achieved. For this reason, verse form was chosen and the work was also based on an earlier attempt (Growing the

Bodhi Tree, Buddhist Association of Thailand, Bangkok 1966) " (p.47). Dr Kaviratna, the Sinhalese Director of the Oriental Institute, Batapola, states: "Some commentators have curious and artificial renderings, which are not akin to the streams of Buddhist and Vedic thought prevalent in India during the time of the Buddha. Most of the European and Indian translators have based their renditions upon these artificial commentaries without any deep penetration into the philosophic currents of that early period. // For this...volume, I have diligently compared the best European translations...with Sanskrit, Burmese and Chinese versions. Special care has been taken to bring out a faithful word-for-word rendition that is lucid, free of bias and, as far as possible, true to the wisdom and pristine grace of the original Pāli texts" (p.xxviii).

Ven. Khantipālo has prefaced his version with two essays on "The Buddha's Teaching from the Dhammapada" and "Everyday Buddhism" which both introduce the text within the context of the Buddhadhamma and "comment on Dhammapada verses which apply to common events in everyday life". They are framed within the conventional style of traditional Theravādin Dhammadesanā, illuminating a timeless teaching but need not, of course, necessarily be read prior to beginning the text. Each vagga ends with its own notes which are kept to a minimum but are indispensable in many cases, particularly where variant readings suggest themselves. Kaviratna avoids inserting notes (except where absolutely necessary) but but includes the romanised Pali text on each page facing the translation and endeavours to expand the text to overcome possible ambiguity, thus v.370:

"(Of the fetters) cut off the five, renounce the five, and (of the virtues) cultivate the five. He who has gone beyond the five attachments is called a bhikkhu who has crossed the stream."

Whereas Khantipālo puts it thus: "Five cut off and five forsake,
a further five should be developed;
a bhikkhu from five fetters free
is called 'A-forder-of-the-flood'"

- but explains the formulas in a footnote.

The admirable attempt of the latter to reproduce the didactic sayings of the Buddha in verse and as accurately as possible does unfortunately result in occasional staccato effects; thus, vv.21-22:

"Heedfulness - the path to the Deathless,
heedlessness - the path to death;
the heedful ones do not die,
the heedless are likened to the dead.

The wise, then, recognizing this
as the distinction of heedfulness,

in heedfulness rejoice, delighting
in the realm of Ariyas."

Kaviratna's equivalent renderings in prose, however, tend to flow in a more relaxed manner (but no doubt the temptation to elaborate beyond the strict confines of the original text is always present), thus:

"Vigilance is the path to immortality; non-vigilance is the path to death; the vigilant do not die; the non-vigilant, though alive, are like unto the dead.

Knowing this outstanding feature of vigilance, the wise delight in vigilance, rejoicing in the ways of the Noble Ones (ariya)."

But the latter mode is surely preferable when what is at stake is comprehension and lucidity, thus Kaviratna renders v.16:

"The doer of wholesome deeds rejoices here and rejoices hereafter; thus he rejoices in both places. Having beheld his pure deeds he rejoices exceedingly".

Khantipālo, on the contrary, tries to scan the verse by inexplicably using a noun as a verb:

"Here he joys, he joys hereafter;
in both wise does the merit-maker joy;
he joys, then does he rejoice,
his own pure karmas seeing."

The term "delights" may not be strong enough to convey the sense of the original term but what is wrong with the tried and tested term "rejoices"?

It would be physically impossible to make comparisons of this nature throughout the two main translations under review. A choice of stanzas must necessarily be subjective, but, whereas there are many fine metrical renderings in Khantipālo's version which aptly crystallise the Buddha's teaching of direct appeal to heart and mind, it has nevertheless to be admitted that the general rule of losing an intangible quality by means of secondary verse translations holds good. For that reason, no doubt, most translators adopt the safer and less arduous method of prose translation. (Sathienpong's translation, despite an impressive Foreword by Prof. S. Tambiah, has been ignored here because of its similarity with Nārada's classic rendering which, in the minds of many, including that of the late I. B. Horner, constitutes the most authoritative recension.)

Kaviratna has included a list of the rarest Dhammapada manuscripts and their provenance in Sri Lanka together with a Pali-Sanskrit-English glossary of key terms related to the relevant verses. Khantipālo has provided appropriate line drawings to illustrate the main themes in each vagga, an index of first lines in English and, most useful of all, a "Thematic Index" of subjects descri-

bed by the verses, which will prove beneficial to the Dhamma student.

In the ultimate analysis, of course, it is the reader who must decide which version - metrical or prose - will hold more appeal to his intellect, understanding and temperament.

REW

Synonymic Collocations in the Tipitaka: a study. M.G.Dhadphale. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona 1980. xiii + 267pp. Rs 50

Anyone who has consulted the Pada-bhājanīya which is embedded in the Vinaya-piṭaka, or the Niddesa, or any Pali commentary, cannot have failed to notice the way in which those who wrote in Pali had a predilection for explaining the meaning of a word by means of another word which was a synonym or near-synonym. Both the Petakopadesa and the Netṭi-ppakaraṇa have sections dealing with the mode of conveying synonyms (Vevacana-hāra) in the guidance they give to commentators, and synonymy is also discussed by the Pali grammarians. Even in non-exegetical texts in the Pali Tipitaka collocations of synonyms or near-synonyms occur, and it is evident that the use of synonyms is a stylistic feature of the language. It is not, however, restricted to the Buddhist Pali scriptures, but is also found in Sanskrit as early as the R̥gveda and in the Jain canon. It is clearly a characteristic of Indian literature as a whole, but synonymy was not employed in Pali solely for stylistic purposes, to add grace to the diction, or to embellish the mode of discourse. The juxtaposition of synonyms can also be regarded as an attempt to define the meaning of a word more accurately by offering a series of approximations, each of which limits the sense more narrowly. In some cases, however, the use of synonyms seems to be dialectal, whereby lexical variants are uttered to enable speakers of various dialects to understand what is being said.

Despite its importance, no full-length analysis of synonymy in Pali has hitherto been made. A dissertation on the subject by Dr M.G.Dhadphale, now published in book form, is therefore greatly to be welcomed. He begins by stating the nature of the problem of synonymy, and then considers definitions and theories which have been put forward by various scholars, both modern Western and ancient Indian. He then surveys different categories of synonyms. Since an explanation or definition of a word has the same meaning as the word being explained or defined, then by an extension of the meaning of the word "synonym" it is possible to regard these explanations and definitions as synonyms. Where the explanation is a metaphor, e.g. the designation of craving (tanhā) as "companion" (duṭṭiya), because craving accompanies us wherever we go, then the metaphor can be regarded as a synonym, i.e. duṭṭiya is a synonym (adhivacana) of tanhā. Dhadphale lists some 200 of such adhivacanas. By a further extension of the concept of synonymy, the word is used of the novel presentations (nibbacanas)

which the Buddha sometimes made up when explaining words by means of a non-historical etymology or etiology, e.g. the explanation of brāhmaṇa as bāhita-pāpa "one who has expelled his evil". This type of equivalence is more appropriately called "folk-etymology" and is found in other languages besides Pali, e.g. asparagus ("sparrow-grass") is "grass for sparrows". Folk etymology is a very important subject in its own right and merits an independent monograph, but meanwhile it is helpful to have Dhadphale's list of some of the more important examples found in the Tipitaka. A further extension of the usage of the term "synonymy" takes us beyond the point where the English definition of the word is appropriate, for in his treatment of synonyms Dhadphale includes the 100 epithets of the Buddha found in Upāli's verses in the Majjhima-nikāya, although it does not really seem possible to regard a word such as nara "man" as a synonym for Bhagavat.

Much of this book is theoretical and analytical in nature, and to that extent it is perhaps too academic for ordinary students of Pali. The needs of such are, however, partly catered for by providing a number of examples of the way in which synonyms enable a reader to decide upon the meaning of a Pali word which by itself is ambiguous or even unintelligible. There are particularly striking examples in the case of synonymous cognates, when a word is explained by a derivation from the same root but with a different affix, e.g. sandeha usually means "doubt" in Sanskrit, but the meaning "body" is assured for some contexts in Pali by the occurrence of deha "body" as a synonym.

Although, as noted above, the author has gone further in some directions than the usual definition of "synonymy" would seem to allow, the limitation of his enquiry to the Tipitaka means that the use of the phenomenon in non-canonical and commentarial texts still awaits investigation. One can do no better than to quote the pair of synonyms with which Dr Dhadphale himself concludes his book: bahukiccā mayā bahukaraṇīyā "we have much to do, we have much to perform".

K.R.Norman

Saṅgharakkhita's Vuttodaya: a study of Pāli metre. Pali text and translated into English by R.Siddhartha. Preface by Professor J.W.de Jong. Sri Satguru Publications, India 1981. Distributed by Indian Books Centre, Delhi. v + 54pp. Rs.50

Although the Vuttodaya is the only extant Pali text dealing with metrics and prosody, it has attracted but little interest from English-speaking scholars since G.E.Fryer published an edition and English translation of it, with extensive notes, in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1877. In 1929 R. Siddhartha produced another edition and English translation in the Journal of

the Department of Letters, University of Calcutta, but this seems to have escaped the notice of most scholars; it is, for example, not mentioned in the Epilegomena to the Critical Pāli Dictionary.

The publication under review is a photo-mechanical reprint of the 1929 article. Certain misprinted or, rather, unprinted scansion marks have been left uncorrected, while their number has been increased by defects in the photographic process. Although the page headings give the author's name as Siddhartha, the new title page calls him Siddhartha. The original article lacked an introduction, and there is consequently no information available about the way in which the edition was made, although there are references in footnotes to the readings of "some editions". Nor are we told which commentaries were employed when making the translation, although two references to the tika suggests that the editor had this available to him.

The Vuttodaya was written by Saṅgharakkhita in Ceylon during the reign of Parākramabāhu (A.D. 1153-86). It is based upon Kedarabhadda's (Sanskrit) Vṛttaratnākara, as Professor de Jong states in the newly added Preface which gives a brief, but very valuable, bibliographical survey of Vuttodaya studies. In 136 stanzas, or portions of stanzas, including an introduction in four stanzas, and a conclusion in three (which Siddhartha omits), Saṅgharakkhita describes a large number of Pali metres, each description being, in fact, a pāda of the relevant metre. He does not, however, describe all Pali metres. He omits the archaic form of the Āryā metre found in a few of the very oldest texts in the Pali Canon, and does not mention the Upatthitappacupita metre found in the Lakkhana-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya. A possible explanation for this is that when Saṅgharakkhita states that he will describe the lokiya metres, he is imitating the Sanskrit usage of laukika, which is opposed to vaidika, i.e. popular (post-Vedic) as opposed to Vedic prosody. He therefore means non-canonical Pali metres and is consequently justified in omitting mention of metres found only in the Canon.

Siddhartha's work has certain defects. Since the Vuttodaya states that the mark of the long syllable is curved, and that of the short syllable straight, Siddhartha adopts this system throughout his translation, e.g. he shows the dactyl as - - -, instead of - - - , which is the normal European form, and the unwary reader is likely to be misled. There are also errors in his translation. He translates sama as "metres which are regular" and addhasama as "metres that are partly regular", whereas Fryer is more accurate with "metres the quarters of which are similar" and "metres the half lines of which are similar", for addhasama refers to metres such as Vaitāliya in which the first and third, and second and fourth, pādas are similar.

Since Fryer gives a critical apparatus for his edition, states the

commentaries which he has consulted and quotes from them, gives more detailed comments upon his translation, and offers several examples of each metre described, it is perhaps to be regretted that the publishers chose to reprint Siddhartha's work rather than Fryer's. Nevertheless, this reprint is to be welcomed as being likely to draw attention to a somewhat neglected text.

K.R.Norman

Editor. A work related in theme to the foregoing two is Topics in Pāli Historical Phonology, published by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1979, at Rs 60.

Its author, Indira Y. Junghare, is Associate Professor in the Department of South Asian Studies, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, and teaches Indo-Aryan Linguistics, Sanskrit, Hindi, Marathi and Indian Philosophy. Her book "is an account of the phonological development of the Pali language from Sanskrit times, which incorporates the latest developments in linguistic scholarship. Within the framework of generative phonology, it deals with a number of interesting aspects concerning sound changes. It examines the underlying forms, the bases for their postulation, readjustment rules, phonological rules, their order with respect to each other and with respect to the rules in [the] other set. The study separates synchronic rules from historical processes, inherited rules from innovated rules, and generalized rules from particularized rules. Furthermore, it discusses restructuring and global constraint, and suggests some phonological universals on the basis of Pali assimilatory processes."

This highly specialised study was also reviewed by the President of the PES for Lingua 54, 1 (Amsterdam 1981, pp.93-99) to which the reader's attention is directed.

Deutsch-Pāli Wörterbuch. Helmut Klar, Octopus Verlag, Vienna 1982. 364pp.

This German-Pali dictionary will, of course, be of interest only to those readers who know at least some German. It contains, we are told, 7,400 German words with 14,200 Pali equivalents. The author claims that as there are English-Pali dictionaries, it is time there was a German-Pali one, which can be used for practice translations into Pali (a possibly old-fashioned, but still useful exercise for those learning any language). He also thinks it could serve as an aid to scholars investigating the sociological and other such material found in, for example, the Jātakas, though I am not quite sure how it is supposed to further this aim. It could, of course, also be of use to those, such as Oriental scholar-bhikkhus, who know Pali already and are learning German.

Anyway, on reflection I realise that it probably has more uses than at first occurred to me: for instance, as a first brief approximation to a Pali 'Roget's Thesaurus', as for many entries a number of synonyms are given (e.g.

for Hund 'dog' seven variant forms are shown, and for Hüter 'guardian' five equivalents. In some cases an attempt at differentiation is made, but not in others. This feature, as far as it goes, can be quite useful to the student, and it might inspire somebody to attempt a real thesaurus on a larger scale.

Nouns are entered in the nominative form, not the 'stem-form' as in the PTS Dictionary: thus dharmo not dhamma. For the final nasal (niggahita) I noted with interest that the author's typewriter has the symbol ṃ (really the international phonetic sign for ng as in sing) which Rhys Davids unwisely introduced instead of under- or over-dotted m. It has long seemed to me that the threefold representation of this letter causes quite unnecessary inconvenience as well as disputes. It should suffice to print an ordinary m, the student being simply taught that (as in French) a special nasal pronunciation occurs in syllable-final position: silam.

The choice of entries seems to me a little arbitrary, depending no doubt on the particular sources extracted. As the author is in fact a doctor, it may be assumed that the medical terms included are more accurate than in some other dictionaries and translations.

The book is clearly a labour of love, is nicely produced in (for the most part) good clear typescript and very solidly bound, appropriately in yellow. Without checking every entry, I noticed a couple of misprints and other small errors: on p.31 samvannketi should read samvanneti (I have substituted a plain m here for the phonetic symbol mentioned above!), and on p.81 vermanī should of course be veramanī (a word well known from the precepts). On p.82 patīccasamupādo occurs under two different head-words. The second of these, Entstehung, bedingte 'Origination, conditioned', is fine; but the first, Entstehen, abhängig-gleichzeitiges 'Origination, dependent-simultaneous', merely reflects the mistranslation of an earlier German scholar. There might be a case for including the term, but it should then be marked as incorrect. On the same page 82 I was delighted to find the 'Eckhartian' Entwerden ('un-becoming') as a head-word for vibhavo.

Maurice Walshe

Pilgrim Kamanita: A Legendary Romance by Karl Gjellerup, translated by John E. Logie. First edition in Thai and English by the Sathirakoses-Nagapradips Foundation B.E. 2520 (1977). Distributed by Saksit Siam Co.Ltd, 1715 Rama IV Rd, Bangkok 11, Thailand. 508pp. Thai and English on facing pages; 4 plates. Baht 150 (on good paper); Baht 80 (on newsprint)

This is an unusual book with a still more unusual history. The author was Danish and originally published his book in German around the beginning of

this century*. It was then translated and published in English (and I wonder why no Western publisher has thought it worthwhile republishing, now that interest in Buddhism is so much greater?), and sometime after rendered into Thai by the two famous literary figures whose pen-names are now the title of the above Foundation, Phya Anuman Rajadhon and Phra Saraprasert respectively.

After its translation into Thai it proved so very popular that it was eventually adapted for Buddhist sermons which to this day can be bought in Bangkok printed on the traditional palm-leaves. This is high praise indeed for a Western novel on the Buddha's times! It has now, probably for the benefit of Thai students learning English, been presented by the enterprising firm of Saksit Siam, in a bilingual edition. Copies may be obtained from the address above.

First, a few words about production and minor errors. This edition (the cheaper one), probably for students, is printed on a Thai paper resembling newsprint. That means its 500 odd pages are not too bulky but on the other hand the book will not last too long. Then the photographic reproduction of the English translation page by page with the Thai, though useful for learning languages, could have been done better. The covers are attractive Indian-style drawings while the text is graced with four drawings by the well-known Thai artist, Angkarn Kalayanapong. It is surprising in view of the novel's age that there are not more errors in the Buddhist parts of the book. Actually these are very few, notably a rather unclear list of Noble Eightfold Path factors on p.214. Also, on the same page, where the Three Characteristics are listed, Max Müller's translation, "All phenomena are unreal", should read - "All dharmas (events) are not-self" (sabbe dhammā anattā). I noticed also, the word 'walk' (pp.380, 432), perhaps a literal translation from the German, where 'conduct' or 'practice' would have been more appropriate. There is an omission easy to amend, on p.212 of the words "Truth of the End of all Suffering". And from a Vinaya point of view it could be objected that the Buddha stands to address the audience (as on p.386), while, of course, he would have sat crosslegged upon a dais or seat. And on p.384 for 'penury' one should read 'material things'. Apparently a footnote is missing on p.290.

Having noticed these small matters that could easily be corrected, it is time to praise further the very broad Indian knowledge of the author as well as his fine and inspiring style. I do not know if the author had ever been to India, but certainly he impresses us with a fascinating picture of high life in ancient times there. And his picture is very convincing in its wealth of detail. Even his flights of fancy like the fiendishly clever robber priest, Vajrasravas and his Kālī Sūtras, are vivid and like enough to be true.

His story is basically of a young merchant's finding of his true love in

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